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PART I.  INTRODUCTION 
         
Less than three years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted 
investment crowdfunding regulations (“Reg. CF”) to facilitate small companies’ efforts to raise 
capital and jumpstart employment.1  Reg. CF provides companies2  potentially one of the most 
disruptive transformations in capital markets.3 Its potential has been lauded as a possible vehicle 
to democratize capital formation and to decentralize investments by way of the Internet.4  
                                               
       1  See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, et al. (2016) [hereinafter SEC Crowdfunding Act]; adopted 
pursuant to the Jumpstart Our Business Companies Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, Title III, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) [hereinafter JOBS Act].  
       2  The term “company” represents small companies that provide notice filings under Reg. CF notwithstanding 
the actual entity classification, e.g.  limited liability company or a partnership. 
      3   William Hinman, Director, SEC, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), Remarks at 
the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, San Francisco, CA (June 14, 2018) (the Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Corporation Finance states that “[s]ome people believe that this technology will transform e-commerce 
as we know it”). See also Howard Marks, How Crowdfunding is Disrupting VCs, FORBES (June 10, 2018) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/06/10/how-crowdfunding-is-disrupting-vcs/#4a105f174823. 
       4  Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Companies, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1013, 1065–66 (2016) 
(recommending a resale exemption to avoid subjecting small stockholders to the risk of fraud-on-the-market and 
to limit disclosure requirements). See also, Lenore Palladino, Democratizing Investment, (May 15, 2018) 
(unpublished paper, available at  Roosevelt Institute/Smith College, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194693#, p. 17) ( arguing that “if portals act as connectors 
rather than thick intermediaries, small investors could, in theory, gain more of the wealth flowing from private 
companies”).  
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However, scholars have raised numerous questions about the companies, the 
investments and the costs of offerings under Reg. CF. Questions and concerns raised include 
whether: companies would refrain from using this newly crafted exemption in light of the 
regulatory complexity and exorbitant costs;5 the quality of investment offerings would 
jeopardize or keep investors away; unsophisticated investors could fall prey to purchasing 
inappropriate securities;6  whether investors would invest in these offerings have been debated 
before and after adoption of the regulations;7  Reg. CF might become the “go to” exemption for 
companies with the worst credit ratings;8 and alternatives may render Reg. CF of little effect.9   
This method of companies crowdfunding securities through intermediaries (“broker 
dealers” or “funding portals”) and offering the securities for sale to the general public is referred 
to as “investment crowdfunding.”  However, two clarifications about this usage should be 
noted.  First, scholars refer to this type of financing method in several other ways: equity 
crowdfunding,10 securities crowdfunding,11 and securities crowdsourcing.12  As the focus of 
this article is on both a company’s attempt to formulate capital and the suitability of securities 
for investors, the term investment crowdfunding seems most appropriate in this context.  
Second, investment crowdfunding could also be used to refer to crowdfunding campaigns that 
                                               
       5  Reza Dibadj, Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 27–29 (2015). Dibadj argues that 
offerings in excess of $500,000 were less discouraging, and predicts that “crowdfunding will have precious little 
impact.” Id. at 41. See also, Patricia H. Lee, Access to Capital or Just More Blues? Issuer Decision-making Post 
SEC Crowdfunding Regulation, 18 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 19, 68–69 (2016) (suggesting that high 
regulatory costs, liability and public disclosure compliance requirements may deter some companies from seeking 
capital through Reg. CF financing methods). 
      6    Id., at 40–41. 
      7  Id., at 39 (arguing that crowdfunding at these costs is a “dismal idea”). See also Jack Wroldsen, 
Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 551 (2017) (discussing inherent risks of 
crowdfunding investments, including “inherent uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-stage start-up 
companies,” sophistication of ordinary investors; and fraud running rampant). 
      8     See Lee, supra note 5, at 70. 
      9     Id., at 64–67. 
    10    Joan MacLeod Heminway, Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 189, 192 
(2017); However, Professor Heminway further points out “that not every crowdfunded offering of a profit-sharing 
instrument or interest is equity crowdfunding.” Id. at 194. See also, Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All 
Regulated but Not Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J.  359, 362 (2015). 
       11 Andrew Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885, 889 (2018). The 
terminology “securities crowdfunding” is a good descriptor, except that the term, in my opinion, gives focus to the 
securities and not the whole transaction, which conceivably is an investment from a shareholder’s perspective. The 
use of the term “equity crowdfunding” appears limiting as companies can seek debt, convertible or equity 
financing. The opposite concern surrounds using the term “securities crowdsourcing,” which implies a broader 
context but is narrowed by putting “securities” in front of the broader term crowdsourcing. 
       12   Richard Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for Labor, Rewards, and Securities, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 47 (2015). 
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are offered under other 1933 Act exemptions or to international campaigns.  The term 
investment crowdfunding is primarily used in this article regarding Reg. CF exemption 
campaigns hosted in the United States.13 
           As the lion share of securities are offered under public offerings or Reg. D safe 
harbor exemptions, outcomes and impacts of Reg. CF offerings are not studied or 
monitored to the same extent. One line of inquiry  is the scope of Reg. CF, including 
questions about the level of company participation, the types of businesses seeking capital 
formation, and the quality of the investments offered. This article seeks to answer to what extent 
Reg. CF investment crowdfunding has facilitated company capital formation and provided a 
means for investors to purchase suitable investments.  Towards that end, the author retrieved 
data from SEC Form C notice filings and other SEC filings completed by companies beginning 
with Reg. CF’s adoption date through June 30, 2018.14  
In light of the research, the author makes several assertions.  First, the progress of 
investment crowdfunding is neither dismal, nor a resounding success, but more a mix of positive 
and troubling developments. The data reviewed and retrieved provides positives regarding 
participation, funding portal expansion, that some companies are raising capital. There has been 
growth in the crowdfunding of Reg. CF securities, and in the sale of digital tokens based on 
blockchain technology (also known as “distributed ledger technology,” or "DLT").15  Other 
                                               
       13    See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United States, has 
become a worldwide phenomenon, with New Zealand leading the charge.”); Anton Didenko, Regulating FinTech: 
Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 311, 313 (2018) (discussing crowdfunding in Kenya and South 
Africa); Kim Wales, PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A GUIDE TO THE NEW CAPITAL 
MARKETS FOR JOB CREATORS, INVESTORS, AND ENTREPRENEURS 218 (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2018). 
       14 Edgar Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,  
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/Companiesearch.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (company Form C, 
C/A, C-U, C-W filings and registrations were retrieved and reviewed here); Form C, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/formc.pdf, (last visited Sept. 16, 2018); With respect to company Reg. CF 
offerings: Form C/W is the method to withdraw an offering; Form C/A is the method to amend an offering; Form 
C/U is the filing to announce the success or failure of an offering after the closing date; Form C/W is the form to 
withdraw the filing before the closing date. See also Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace: 
Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal Securities Law, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924 (2013) (The SEC has allowed 
Edgar Filings since 1984 to permit companies to electronically file disclosure documents under the 1933, 1934 
Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940.) 
       15    See Kevin Werbach, Satoshi’s Solution, The Blockchain And The New Architecture Of Trust, (The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2018, Ch. 2, 49) stating that “Cryptocurrency enthusiasts envision digital tokens as being 
widely accepted for all sorts of financial payments by people around the world, as credit cards are….). See also, 
Jay G. Baris & Joshua A. Klayman, Blockchain Basics for Investment Managers: A Token of Appreciation, 51 
The Review of Securities and Commodities Regulation: An Analysis of Current Laws and Regulations Affecting 
the Securities and Future Industries 67, 68, March 21, 2018.  
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troubling inferences of investment crowdfunding company offerings, generally, is that capital 
raised pales in comparison to other alternative means to raise capital and more specifically, the 
expansion of securities (i.e. digital tokens and coins) offered to investors has risks for both 
investors and the companies.16 Reg. CF digital tokens offerings reliant on the blockchain raise 
troubling concerns regarding the offering of  complex, uncertain and speculative securities, 
which raise questions regarding investor’s return on investment.  Some companies have not 
been successful with their digital token offerings, with cancelled offerings rather than capital 
raised. The downside of growth in funding portals is that funding portals used in offerings17  are 
typically located in limited parts of the country, with limited liability. Many areas of the country 
are not participating in Reg. CF capital formation, whether that is in investment crowdfunding 
generally, or digital token offerings specifically.  Unless a company utilizes an alternative 
means of financing,  they may not have access to capital for their emerging enterprise. The 
foregoing raising the question whether the goals of job creation and capital formation will be 
met under the current regulatory scheme. 
Insights from the research suggest that this topic is more nuanced than initially apparent, 
because the larger market of initial coin offerings is represented by well publicized ICO 
offerings which have the greatest volume of transactions when compared to Reg. CF digital 
tokens.18 That being said, ICOs are being closely monitored by the SEC, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).19  However, 
Reg. CF blockchain-based offerings are not monitored in the same way since companies file 
                                               
       16    See infra Part II(C). 
       17   U.S. SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers (April 5, 2017) (In 
order to act as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) 
of the Securities Act, an organization is required to register – either as a broker-dealer under Section 15(b) of the 
Exchange Act or as a funding portal pursuant to Section 4A(a)(1) of the Securities Act. These funding portals 
register with the SEC on Form Funding Portal and can be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, limited 
liability company, or other organized entity acting as an intermediary in crowdfunding transactions). The funding 
portal must also become a member of FINRA. See Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, 
https://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). See also Forms, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/forms (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (additional 
information for registration, amendments, and withdrawal are set out in Instructions for Forms, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/forms and in text of the rules, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/secrulesregs.htm#sea34). 
       18    See infra Part II(C). 
       19  See Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the 
Democratization of Public Capital Markets 41 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 338, 2017) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104, at 5 (noting that “the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and its counterparts in other jurisdictions have turned their attention to token sales”), with 
permission.  
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the required and periodic notices with the SEC including disclosure documents that include the 
predictions of risk affiliated with the offerings.  
          To illustrate the findings, this article proceeds in five succeeding substantive parts:  
PART II provides a brief history of the Reg. CF exemption law and the research findings 
about investment crowdfunding, generally and digital tokens, more specifically;   
PART III provides insights of the current state of offering blockchain based digital 
tokens to unsophisticated investors and the silver linings in the data;  
PART IV provides recommendations towards a path forward in Reg. CF.  First, the SEC 
should re-evaluate its regulatory policy in light of the proliferation of blockchain based token 
offerings, gaps in funding portals and provide additional warnings to unsophisticated investors 
who may be taking on enhanced investment risk. The uncertainty and risk of digital tokens 
reliant on blockchain technology foretells a troubling high risk of investment loss, which may 
be in addition to the expected high risk of loss for startup tech companies. Second, companies, 
particularly idealistic tech startups, that are considering the offer of digital tokens, should 
thoughtfully consider alternatives to these offerings. There remains a level of uncertainty and 
risk in these offerings, which could result in greater risk and liability than the alternative 
financing available to them. Last, economic development organizations should consider 
developing their role in attracting, designing and implementing funding portals to provide the 
support that tech and other startup companies need to raise capital for their business.  
PART V provides concluding remarks. 
 
PART II.  REG. CF LAW AND DIGITAL TOKENS  
 
        A.   Capital Formation 
 
 Historically, raising capital was a pathway for large, well established enterprises. One 
way larger enterprises raised large amounts of capital was through traditional public offerings 
of securities under the 1933 Act.  Prior to Reg. CF, companies who sought to offer securities 
had several options.  First, they could register securities pursuant to the 1933 Act, which 
provides a statutory framework for the federal regulation of securities offerings.  Registration 
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would be cost prohibitive for these smaller companies.20  Second, companies could seek one 
of several safe harbor exemptions discussed further in this section.  The other traditional way 
of raising capital was pursuant to an exemption under the 1933 Act.  Third, the company could 
just avoid offering securities and consider a host of other funding alternatives.21  
 “Crowdfunding is the use of the internet or other means to raise money . . . in small 
amounts from a large number of contributors to support a wide range of ideas and ventures.”22  
Investment crowdfunding is the younger sibling of the crowdfunding of ideas, goods and 
services offered to the public. Investment crowdfunding started with Title III of the Crowdfund 
Act.  This Act amended the 1933 Act and allowed companies23 to offer and sell up to one 
million dollars of unregistered equity securities in a twelve-month period, without registering 
them.24  The SEC raised the cap on exempted transactions to allow companies to raise $1.07 
million in 2017.25 The normative goal of the Crowdfund Act was to encourage small business 
growth and further employment, specifically to “help entrepreneurs raise the capital they 
need to put Americans back to work and create an economy that’s built to last.”26  The 
Crowdfund Act aimed to lower regulatory hurdles for companies trying to go public and 
to allow firms to have more private shareholders.27  The Crowdfund Act further promised 
to provide issuers the ability to access investors via the Internet with the aid of funding portals.  
                                               
       20    15 U.S.C. § 77(f)(b) et. seq. 
       21    See generally Wales, supra note 13; see also, Lee, supra note 5, at 50–66. 
       22 RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
799 (Cengage, 13th ed., 2017); see also Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2014) (describing crowdfunding as a “financing method used primarily by 
companies and small businesses to raise small amounts of capital from a large number of people over the Internet”). 
See also, Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 n.1 (2014). 
       23  The Crowdfund Act would allow eligible, domestic, nonpublic issuers to raise up to $1.07 million as of 
2017 (a figure that would be periodically adjusted for inflation) Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding Investment Limits 
Increase, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
and-bulletins/ib_crowdfundingincrease  
       24   JOBS Act, at § 302. 
       25  In the first year, the SEC capped the investments at $1,000,000 and during raised the cap to $1,070,000 
in 2017. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1).. 
       26  Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Companies (“JOBS”) Act, 
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-
jumpstart-our-business-Companies-jobs-act; see also Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1030 (discussing the goals of the 
Crowdfund Act). 
       27     New York Stock Exchange, Regulation A+ (“REG A+”), https://www.nyse.com/regulation-a (last visited 
on Sept. 6, 2018). 
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Schwartz described the goals as a quest for efficiency, on the one hand, and a quest for 
inclusiveness on the other.28   
Offering securities without either a registration or under a safe harbor is illegal.  
Therefore, registering securities or offering securities under an exemption would be necessary 
to avoid violating Section 5 of the 1933 Act.29  Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 1933 Act generally 
prohibit any person, including broker-dealers, from using the mails or interstate means to sell 
or offer to sell, either directly or indirectly, any security unless a registration statement is in 
effect or has been filed with the Commission as to the offer and sale of such security, or an 
exemption from the registration provisions applies.30  For this reason, companies seeking to 
avoid complications under the securities laws would register or find an allowable safe harbor 
exemption.  The next section provides a brief overview of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s adoption of Reg. CF and the differences between the law and economic 
requirements of Reg. CF filings from other 1933 Act safe harbor exemptions.31 
 
1. What is Reg. CF? 
 
The idea of offering securities in small amounts to a large number of participants is not 
only novel, but is also becoming a disruptive financial technological innovation.  This 
disruption is precipitated, in part, by the SEC’s implementation of the Crowdfund Act and, in 
part, due to a variety of external factors.  In a very nascent way, Reg. CF was a positive step 
towards democratizing investment markets and decentralizing access to capital.32 In light of 
                                               
       28    See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 893. 
       29    See 1933 Securities Act, §§ 5(a), (c) (“Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all offers and sales of 
securities in interstate commerce to be registered, unless an exemption from registration is available.”). SEC 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-broker-dealer-duty-section4.htm 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018). For cases establishing a prima facia case, see, e.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 
121 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006);  SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 
U.S. 119, 126 (1953). 
       30    See 1933 Securities Act, at §§ 5(a), (c). 
       31    This research does not include a discussion on intrastate offerings of securities. 
       32    Society’s ability to democratize and to decentralize access to capital is a question that scholars will research 
in the upcoming years.  
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the intersection of e-commerce and social media, scholars have considered such crowdfunding 
moves to represent “populist, Internet-based finance.”33 
Reg. CF are regulations that allow crowdfunding capital formation for small 
undercapitalized companies. To that end, Reg. CF set forth structures, compliance 
requirements, restrictions, responsibilities and costs to allow for smaller equity investments. 
Reg. CF facilitates the raising of capital from the general public through the sale of securities,34 
provides opportunities for companies35 to utilize internet funding portals, and helps to locate 
members of the public willing to invest.36  The Crowdfund Act and the Reg. CF exemption 
brought the promise of “a new, unregistered, wide-reaching brand of securities offering…that, 
together with other changes in U.S. securities regulation, may become a new gateway to public 
securities markets.”37 
Through Reg. CF, U.S. companies that are not already Exchange Act Reporting 
companies are allowed to raise up to $1.07 million in a twelve-month period; allow the 
solicitation of their shares; and have the offering be exempt from SEC and state securities law 
registration.38  Such measures have joined a host of other developments that have collectively 
opened the floodgates of crowdfunding investment.  For example, Congress has allowed 
companies to raise money and offer shares to the general public, not just to accredited or 
sophisticated investors.  
                                               
       33  See Heminway, supra note 10, at 193; see also, Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global 
Significance of Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM. 
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 347, 357, 366 (2016) (“The rise of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—
websites generally associated with the emergence of Web 2.0—as well as the popular payment services site PayPal, 
enabled crowdfunding to gain greater visibility.”). 
       34   See, e.g.,17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2016); Parsont, supra note 22, at 282. 
       35    Of the 1,112 companies that filed Form C’s to register securities, four had principal offices outside of the 
United States and those locations included: Armenia, Spain, Kenya and the UK. See infra Part II(C) and 
accompanying data. 
       36   See infra Part II(C). 
       37   See Heminway, supra note 10, at 205; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE  
DAME L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2018) (explaining that “[s]ecurities crowdfunding is a new idea, modeled on the 
recently introduced and highly successful concept of ‘reward’ crowdfunding, which is practiced on Kickstarter, 
IndieGoGo, and other websites”). 
       38    U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers 
(May 13, 2016 (with Apr. 5, 2017 updates)), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-
051316.htm. 
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In addition to Reg. CF, Congress also approved Reg. A+ in the JOBS Act.39  In 
furtherance of the goals, Reg. CF, Reg. A, and the amended Reg. A+, provided new 
opportunities for small businesses to attract the financing they needed to run their businesses.40  
The basic details about each regulation are briefly set forth below.  Under the regulatory 
regimes, the definition of “security” is based on the broadly worded provision of Section 2(a)(1) 
of the 1933 Act, which states as follows:  
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate 
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or 
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, 
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest 
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or 
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign 
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
“security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing.41 
 
Effective June 2015, the SEC amended Reg. A and authorized Reg. A+ to allow a U.S. 
or Canadian company two types of greater funding opportunities, set forth as either Tier 1 
or Tier 2 offerings.42  For Tier 1 offerings, companies can raise up to $20 million in a 12-
month period, with no more than $6 million in offers by selling to security-holders that are 
affiliates.43  For Tier 2, companies are allowed to raise up to $50 million in a twelve-month 
period using a “public solicitation” of its shares, with no more than $15 million to affiliates, 
and have the offering be exempt from SEC and state securities law registration.44  
                                               
       39   17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2015) (explaining the scope of the exemption). 
       40   Anzhela Knyazeva, Regulation A+: What Do We Know So Far?, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., at 2–7 
(Nov. 2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf. 
       41    15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
       42     See Knyazeva, supra note 40, at 1–3 (Regulation A, amended June 19, 2015, provides an exemption from 
registration for certain small issues). 
       43  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (2015). 
       44  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015); see also Knyazeva, supra note 40, at 3 n.10. 
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There are also basic requirements applicable to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings, 
including company eligibility requirements, bad actor disqualification provisions, disclosure 
requirements, and more.  Additional requirements apply to Tier 2 offerings, including 
limitations on the amount of money a non-accredited investor may invest in a Tier 2 offering, 
requirements for audited financial statements, and the filing of ongoing reports.45  Issuers of 
Tier 2 offerings are not required to register or qualify their offerings with state securities 
regulators.  However, “resales of securities purchased in a Tier 2 offering that do not meet the 
condition of one of the exemptions from state registration must be registered with state 
securities regulators.”46 
 
2. How Reg. CF differs from Other Exempt and Nonexempt Offerings 
             
a. 1933 Act Offerings47 
 
            Reg. CF filings and 1933 Act offerings differ significantly.  Other than involving the 
same three discernable players—a company, a funding portal and an investor—there is not 
much similarity between these methods of offering securities.  Differences include transaction 
structure/size, investment research availability, liquidity, market share, exchange systems and 
the types of securities offered.  First and foremost is the cost.  In a 1933 Act public offering, 
the costs start at $4.2 million dollars in offering costs directly attributable to the IPO, plus 
underwriter fees equal to 4-7% of gross proceeds.48  
                                               
       45  Knyazeva, supra note 40, at 3 n.8. 
       46  Id. at 26 n.59 (citing SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 2017) 
(question 182.10). 
       47    Registration under the 1933 Act includes registering a set of documents, including a prospectus, which 
are filed with the SEC before an entity goes public and quarterly and annual reports after the entity goes public. 
See U.S. SEC, Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). See also Alexander F. 
Cohen, Financial Statement Requirements in US Securities Offerings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG., (Feb. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/05/financial-statement-requirements-in-us-
securities-offerings/. 
       48      Considering an IPO to fuel your company’s future?, PWC, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html (last visited at Sept. 20, 2018); see also 
Jay Preston, Note, Initial Coin Offerings: Innovation, Democratization and the SEC, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
318, 328 (2018) (estimating between $4-28 million dollars). 
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Pursuant to Reg. CF, for the first time, small investors are allowed to buy small dollar 
amounts of unregistered securities from companies. The SEC’s threshold bifurcates investors 
into two categories: Those who have more than $100,000 in income and those with less than 
$100,000. The SEC further clarified that if both an investor's income and net worth are less than 
$100,000, then the amount invested could not exceed $2,000 or five percent of their net worth 
(whichever is greater).49 However, there is no floor to the income and net worth, with an issuer 
relying on their funding portals to assess investor limits.50  The securities offered continue to 
be of high risk with provisions that seemingly protect companies more so than the investors. 
          Reg. CF investors have a one-year restriction on the resale of Reg. CF or other restricted 
stock from other safe harbor transactions.  The reasonableness of these resale restrictions 
continues to be debated.  Legal scholars have argued that allowing companies to sell stock 
through crowdfunding and mini-IPO’s is not enough—securities regulations must allow 
investors to resell that stock.51  Oranburg makes three arguments to support the view that more 
liquidity is fundamental to meet the normative goals of crowdfunding.  First, investors are 
discouraged from investing because they do not have a way to liquidate their stock easily in a 
resale market.  Second, capital continues to be consolidated in more mature companies instead 
of young organizations.  Third, wealthy and influential investors can resell large blocks of stock 
and can do so in secret trading environments.52  The liquidity is also problematic for investors, 
as there may not be a ready and available market for their newly purchased security.  Oranburg’s 
solution is to call for a “144B” venture-exchange safe harbor, in addition to the “144A” venture 
transactions on the OTC markets.53  
Also, a resale exchange for Reg. CF investment crowdfunding transactions does not 
currently exist.  For example, an investor holding less than $100 can buy publicly offered 1933 
                                               
       49    See Dibadj, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that the SEC “bifurcates investors into two categories: those whose 
annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 and those whose annual income or net worth is at or above that 
amount…”).  
       50    Id. at 24 (noting that the issuer may rely on the intermediary to assess these limits.) 
       51 See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–1016.  See also, Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2399 (1998). 
       52  See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–1016. Oranburg defines dark-pool markets as trading markets 
available and known to very few investors and further notes that these dark-pool markets are “private stock markets 
that are not accessible by the general investing public.” Id. at 1047. 
       53    Id. at 1055–1057 (noting curiosity surrounding why “the SEC has not already acted to create a domestic 
venture exchange”). 
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Act securities and then trade the stock freely on their own or through a registered 
broker/dealer.54  Securities can also be bought under Reg. CF, but resale is not readily available.  
To solve the resale and liquidity problems, lawmakers have presented two promising bills that 
passed the U.S. House of Representatives.  The first bill is the Main Street Growth Act.55  The 
Main Street Growth Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to allow for the 
registration of venture exchanges with the SEC to provide a venue that is tailored to the needs 
of small and emerging companies and offers qualifying companies one venue in which their 
securities can trade.56  A second bill is the Crowdfunding Amendments Act.  This bill would 
allow crowdfunding investors to pool their money together into a fund that is advised by a 
registered investment advisor.57  
In 1933 Act offerings, traditional offerings have included common stock, preferred 
stock and debt instruments.  However, in Reg. CF offerings, securities offerings can include 
standard equity, debt, revenue participations, and a variety of investment contracts,58 that 
funding portals have developed and promoted for a company’s use.59  Companies have begun 
to offer more complex investment contracts, such as the SAFE -- simple agreement for future 
                                               
       54 For members of the public, stocks on NYSE and NASDAQ can be purchased at small dollar amounts 
with brokerage fees as low as $5.95. Online Broker Partners, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/online-brokers/ 
(last visited at Oct. 23, 2018); see also NYSE Exchange Fees, 
https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=934 (last visited at Oct. 23, 2018).  see also, 
https://www.tdameritrade.com/pricing.page (stock trades at $6.95 over the internet). 
       55  Main Street Growth Act is sponsored by Rep. Tom Emmer (R-MN). H.R. 5877 - Main Street Growth 
Act, 115th Cong. (2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5877/actions 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2018). H.R. 5877 was introduced on May 18, 2018 and passed the House on July 10, 2018. 
Id. On July 11, 2018, the bill was received in the Senate and read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs. Id. It would allow for the registration of venture exchanges with the SEC to provide 
a venue that is tailored to the needs of small and emerging companies and offers qualifying companies one venue 
in which their securities can trade. Id. 
       56    Id. 
       57 H.R. 6380 - Crowdfunding Amendments Act, 115th Cong. (2018), CONGRESS.GOV, 
HTTPS://WWW.CONGRESS.GOV/BILL/115TH-CONGRESS/HOUSE-BILL/6380 (LAST VISITED NOV. 14,, 2018). H.R. 
6380 introduced in the House on July 16, 2018 and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on July 
16, 2018. Id. 
       58   Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 589 (Wroldsen identified two new forms of simplified contracts, the "SAFE" 
and the 'KISS," securities specially tailored for crowdfunding investment offerings with high-growth potential. 
These securities hold great promise, though not without drawbacks. Wroldsen developed an understanding of the 
taxonomy, terms and variations in crowdfunding investment contracts, illustrating a baseline, standardized 
investment contract, as well as two the emerging SAFE and KISS.); See also, Joseph M. Green, Crowdfunding 
and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 170-175 (2016). 
       59     Id., at 546. 
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equity, the KISS, -- keep it simple security, and contractual revenue sharing agreements.60  
SAFEs are not debt instruments, but rather future equity instruments, whereby shareholders 
have no voting or shareholder rights, and no lender rights or priorities.61  The KISS, on the other 
hand, is a debt instrument that offers convertible securities (equity or debt) with favorable terms 
(e.g. significant investor rights, protections, and preferences upon conversion into equity).62 
The research findings demonstrate the continuation of SAFE investment contract security 
offerings.63  
Under Reg. CF, there has been a growth in the number of investment contracts known 
as the simple agreement for future token (“SAFT”) -- an investment contract between a 
purchaser and seller that promises the delivery of digital tokens or another equity/debt 
instruments in the future,64 conditionally or unconditionally.65  SAFT and their corollary future 
digital tokens expanded in Reg. CF offerings between November of 2017 through June 30, 
2018.66  “The distinctive feature of the SAFT is that it splits the promise of future tokens from 
the distribution of operational tokens.”67 
In 2016, Professor Joseph Green evaluated investment contracts offered under Reg. CF 
and found that the SAFEs were not so “safe” or appropriate investments, as many of the 
companies would not actually be able to raise venture capital funding.68   At this time, the typical 
                                               
       60  Id. at 582; see also Giorgia Coltella, SAFE vs. KISS, the evolution of the convertible note, MEDIUM (Sept. 
19, 2017), https://medium.com/centrally/safe-vs-kiss-the-evolution-of-the-convertible-note-4859d42a867d.  
       61  Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 573. 
       62     Id. at 570–71. 
      63    As of June 2018, outside of common stock transactions, SAFEs were the number one type of security 
offered by two of the top five largest funding portals. 
       64    Pete Martin, What the Cardozo report gets right and wrong about SAFT’s approach to ICO self-regulation, 
MEDIUM (DEC. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/votem/what-the-cardozo-report-gets-right-and-wrong-about-safts-
approach-to-ico-self-regulation-3bf7fbcc7be5 (citing the CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT RESEARCH REPORT #1, 
NOT SO FAST – RISKS RELATED TO THE USE OF A “SAFT” FOR TOKEN SALES (Nov. 21, 2017)). See also, Averie 
Brookes, U.S. Regulation of Blockchain Currencies: A Policy Overview, 9 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 75, 102 
(2018) (noting a company’s use of a SAFT to launch its token sale and later developed a working model for self-
regulation). 
       65    See infra Part II(C). 
       66    See infra Part II(C). 
       67    See Werbach, supra note 15, Connecting the Legal and the Technical, Ch. 10, at 207 and noting that 
(The initial transaction is typically handled under SEC Regulation D or Regulation Crowdfunding, two of the 
exceptions to the registration requirements for securities offerings.). 
       68   See Green,  supra note 58, at 170, 174 (Green warns that “the nomenclature ‘SAFE’ may actually be 
somewhat misleading” and that “[t]he safety implied by the clever acronym ‘SAFE’ actually points to the 
instrument’s safety for the issuing company—which is able to avoid the maturity dates associated with convertible 
notes—rather than any safety for the investor.”). 
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SAFE was a security developed by a Silicon Valley company accelerator named Y Combinator 
for companies expecting to raise institutional venture capital funding at a later date.69  Time 
will tell whether they will be suitable investments for investors. Reg. CF offerings are occurring 
within a broader context of advancements in distributed ledger technology,70 which present new 
opportunities and challenges for companies in their quest to raise capital, and offer complexity 
for the investing public and regulators.71  
As far as similarities between Reg. CF offerings and 1933 Act offerings go, both have 
notice requirements and companies are subject to liability under Reg. CF investment 
crowdfunding. Securities may be sold to any member of the public in small amounts, but with 
a smaller cap of $1.07 million for Reg. CF companies, compared to offerings in other safe 
harbor exemptions. Second, neither purchase requires that the investor be sophisticated or 
accredited like other exempt filings require.  Third, investors can lose their money from buying 
shares and other investment instruments from a company registered under the 1933 Act, 
possibly as easily as they might under Reg. CF.  This means that for both the 1933 Act publicly 
offered securities and investment crowdfunding: 1) Securities are available publicly; 2) 
Investors need not be sophisticated or accredited investors before purchase; and 3) Investors 
can risk the loss of their investment.  Both offerings must be mindful not to violate Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”).72  Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act makes it unlawful to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors."73  Rule 10(b)(5) makes it unlawful “to make any untrue 
                                               
       69 See id., at 171. 
       70    The technological phase relates to the new cryptocurrency heights that have recently been accomplished.  
First, there has been success in raising small dollar amounts via Reg. CF to serve as a first step before a second 
round of funding.  Second, there have been successful ICO’s, Reg. D and Reg A+ are raising significant dollars in 
cryptocurrency, despite recent legal travails, fraud and hacking. Third, the development of Blockchain and 
complimentary exchanges tie in to the future trading of Reg. CF tokens.   
       71  See Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 551 (discussing inherent risks of crowdfunding investments, including 
inherent uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-stage start-up companies; sophistication of ordinary 
investors; and fraud running rampant) 
       72    15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  
       73   Id.; e.g., In Morris v. Overstock.com, the company was sued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for 
misrepresentations or omissions made to shareholders on their intent to engage in an initial coin offering. No. 18-
cv-00271, at *2–*3 (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2018), 
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statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading,” as well as other manipulative and deceptive activities.74 
 
b.   Exempt Offerings 
 
From the perspectives of both companies and investors, complying with securities laws 
is wrought with complexity. From a company’s perspective, after the entity has decided to raise 
capital, they must determine whether they want to issue common or preferred stock, debt, or 
possibly an investment contract.  Once that decision is made, there is a need to determine which 
exemption is best to proceed with if they do want to sell a security.  Not discussed in this Article 
is the possibility of filing an intrastate security offering.  Many states have passed their own 
state-level crowdfunding exemptions, which exempt small business intrastate crowdfunding 
from federal securities registration.75  As of 2016, the majority of intrastate crowdfunding 
provisions required a notice filing with a state regulator.76  However, there are unrealistic 
limitations of selling only to in-state investors.  While there may be a variety of exemptions 
available, there may be only one viable choice. 
There are many differences between Reg. CF offerings and other exempt filings.77  For 
example, Reg. D offerings under the 1933 Act allow two exemptions from Section 5 registration 
requirements under Rules 50478 and 506.79  These offerings are considered private offerings 
                                               
       74   17 C.F.R § 240.10b(5). 
       75  Evan Glustrom, Intrastate Crowdfunding in Alaska: Is There Security In Following The Crowd?, 34 
ALASKA L. R. 293, 308 (2017) (noting that “[t]hese state-level regulations completely exempt intrastate 
crowdfunding from SEC regulation so long as the issuer is organized in the state and all investors reside in the 
state”). 
       76  See Final Rules: Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, at 62 n. 218 (Oct. 
26, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/33-10238.pdf. E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and the District of Columbia. Other states 
have pending legislation that would require notice filings for intrastate crowdfunded offerings, e.g., California, 
Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, and New Hampshire.  
       77  The Commission amended Rule 504, effective January 20, 2017. Id, at 76-82. It also repealed Rule 50, 
effective May 22, 2017. Id. at 82-86. Finally, the Commission adopted new rule 147A as a safe harbor to the 
Section 3(a)(11) exemption, effective April 20, 2017. Id. at 16.   
       78  17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (2017). 
       79  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2013). 
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and have different restrictions than a public offering.  Reg. D offerings, which can only be made 
to accredited sophisticated investors, can be resold under Rules 144 and 144A with volume 
restrictions.80  But, resale restrictions continue for non-accredited investors.81       
There are additional restrictions and limitations on Reg. D safe harbor exemptions.  In 
Rule 504 offerings, issuers are limited to offering up to $5 million dollars in securities in a 
twelve-month period, provided that the offerings are consistent with the public interest, and 
certain bad actors are disqualified from participation.82  “Rule 504 currently permits the resale 
of securities issued in Rule 504 offerings that involve general solicitation or advertising where 
either the offering is registered in one or more states and one or more states require the 
dissemination of a state-approved disclosure document or the offering is exempt but sales are 
only made to accredited investors.”83  “Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation and limits 
sales to no more than 35 non-accredited investors” whereas Rule 506(c) allows general 
solicitation to an unlimited number of accredited investors.84  In the next section, some 
additional background is provided about the emergence of crowdfunding and other available 
exemptions and safe harbors operative during the new investment crowdfunding era.  Under 
506(c), companies may sell to an unlimited number of accredited investors, but cannot solicit 
investors.85  
Outside of the costs and limitations trading, theoretically, there is no reason that 
Reg. CF offerings could not succeed and serve as an extremely positive force. Positive 
outcomes could realize democratized company offerings,86 lower crowdfunding transaction 
                                               
       80    See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1026–27. 
       81    Id., at 1025. 
       82    See Rohr and Wright, supra note 19, at 75. 
       83    Final Rules: Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, at 82 (Oct. 26, 2016) 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/33-10238.pdf. 
       84  Id., at 86; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2013) (“Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor 
either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business 
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment[.]”). 
       85    See Preston, supra note 48, at 326. 
       86 See Pekmezovic, supra note 33, at 347 (arguing that equity crowdfunding “enhances access to capital for 
SMEs globally while simultaneously democratizing access to investments for ordinary citizens”); see also 
Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1029–31 (discussing the JOBS Act’s potential to achieve purported goals of 
democratizing access to capital, creating jobs, and growing the innovation economy). 
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costs,87 increasing shareholder choice and funding portal inclusivity and efficiency.88  
However, a flood of speculative, risky and uncertain securities, may hinder positive 
outcomes. The worst case is that the macro benefits of this particular safe harbor is 
hijacked.  Hijacking may be a strong term to use, however, to the extent that a flood of 
largely unregulated and potentially volatile securities,89 securities fraud risk90 or unfettered 
exuberance, the goals of the Crowdfund Act may not be realized. 
 
3. Reg. CF Offerings and the Sale of Digital Tokens 
The issuance of digital tokens reliant on blockchain technology is one of those explosive 
developments in capital fundraising campaigns.91 Most of this activity is happening in the IPO 
markets, but some of the activity is occurring in Reg. CF offerings.  The developments have 
skeptics and proponents. On the one hand billionaire investor, Warren Buffett say, "Stay away 
from it. It's a mirage.”92  Meanwhile, former U.S. CFTC Chairman, Gary Gensler states that 
“blockchain technology….underlying bitcoin has a real chance to be a catalyst for change in 
the world of finance, and that’s because it moves data and it also applies computer code against 
a decentralized network.”93 
                                               
       87    See Lee, supra note 5, at 68–69 and accompanying text. 
       88   See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 912 (theorizing that securities crowdfunding campaigns have a tension 
between inclusiveness and efficiency: “[t]he SEC concluded, again, probably correctly, that some level of 
exclusivity is needed for crowdfunding to work; total inclusivity is simply too inefficient to function”). 
      89   Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution from Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 35 (2017) (advocating four approaches regarding how to properly regulate 
FinTech, which include: “doing nothing;” “cautious permissiveness through flexibility and forbearance;” 
“restricted experimentation;” “and regulatory development”). 
       90 In the midst of SEC’s adoption of Reg. CF, scholars wrote about investor protection, securities fraud, and 
finding ways to balance what was perceived as an opening for widespread theft of investor’s contributions. See 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 606–07 (2015); Dibadj, 
supra note 4, at 31, 39–44; Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn, The New 
Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439–40 (2012). 
       91    See Rohr, supra note 19, at 1. 
       92    Mitch Tuchman, Heed Warren Buffett’s warning:  Bitcoin is pure FOMO, Cryptocurrency mania rests on 
greater fools, February 10, 2018, adding that “The idea that it has some huge intrinsic value is just a joke, in my 
view." https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heed-warren-buffetts-warning-bitcoin-is-pure-fomo-2017-12-26 
(Last retrieved on December 7, 2018). 
       93    Dave Liedtka, Cryptocurrencies, Most Tokens From ICOS Are Securities, Former CFTC Head Says, 
Bloomberg (October 15, 2018) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/most-tokens-from-icos-
are-securities-former-cftc-head-says (Last retrieved on December 8, 2018). 
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To understand these assets and securities, descriptions of the terms tokens, crypto 
tokens, cryptocurrency, and blockchain ledger technology are briefly described below.  The 
definition of the word token has a recently been revised to: “a piece resembling a coin issued 
for use . . . by a particular group on specified terms”, “issued as money by some person or body 
other than a de jure government,” or “as a unit of cryptocurrency.”94  Historically, the word 
token represented a tangible item, such as a bus token or a game token.  Practitioners and 
scholars, classify tokens as “digital tokens,” with a unit of value tied to a blockchain ledger.95  
The token’s “virtual” or “digitized” characteristic evokes the colloquial term “crypto token,” a 
term used by the tech industry to describe virtual currencies or digital assets tied to the 
blockchain,96 and recently by courts and the SEC as “cryptocurrency ‘tokens’ or ‘coins.’ ”97  
Digital tokens can be a reward, combining functional and consumptive elements and also can 
be fundamental to a blockchain network.98  Tokens can be purchased either with cash or by 
using other coins.99  Tokens are also potentially tradeable and transferable through an exchange 
for another coin or an item of value.100  Recently, the IRS has ruled that digital tokens will be 
treated as property for federal income tax purposes.101 
The SEC mandates that funding portals host a company’s offering to investors. To 
visualize the role of the funding portal, using Werbach’s square surrounded by six circles is 
                                               
       94   Token, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/token (last visited Sept. 15, 
2018). Cyptocurrency is defined as “any form of currency that only exists digitally, that usually has no 
central issuing or regulating authority but instead uses a decentralized system to record transactions 
and manage the issuance of new units, and that relies on cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and 
fraudulent transactions”). See also Cryptocurrency MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). 
       95    Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 70. Baris and Klayman describe digital tokens as representing a unit 
of value, which may make them look more like commodities (“There is tremendous flexibility in how to structure 
digital tokens and what those digital tokens may represent.”). Id. Nathan Dudgeon and Gareth Malna, Distributed 
Ledger Technology: From Blockchain to ICOS, 37 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’y Rep. 4, 41 (February 2018) (“A 
blockchain facilitates online transactions by acting as a secure, digitized, decentralized, public ledger.”). 
       96    Michael Patterson, Crypto’s 80% Plunge is Now Worse Than the Dot-Com Crash, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12, 
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-12/crypto-s-crash-just-surpassed-dot-com-levels-as-
losses-reach-80. 
      97    United States v. Maksim Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 
2018). 
      98     Baris & Klayman, supra note 15,  at 75 n.47. 
      99     See Zaslavskiy, supra note 97, at *5 (noting the type of currency, such as bitcoin or ether, that can purchase 
an app token); see also infra Part II(C).  
     100    See infra Part II(C).    
     101    Notice, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (2014) 
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helpful. An intermediary is a central player in the offering and provides a role between the 
company and the investor, as follows: 
 
Graphic of an Intermediary’s Role102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples of large enterprises utilizing intermediary models are Amazon and eBay, 
Uber and Airbnb, where the consumer goes to their respective platform selling the items of a 
third party business. This intermediary model for funding portals was adopted the SEC, but it 
may provide a false sense of security for investors, as  the funding portal has limited liability 
and the funding portal isn’t designing the disclosure language included in the offering by the 
companies. What is more ironic about centralizing the intermediary funding portal function is 
that for digital tokens, what is offered would be quite a different type of securities model, not 
centralized at all because the security is reliant on the development of the blockchain network.  
Werbach illustrates how a blockchain network operates, which he describes as one 
where “nothing is assumed to be trustworthy….except the output of the network itself….and 
defines the landscape for the interactions with law, regulation, and governance.”103 The 
blockchain based digital token could be illustrated as the future potential of a peer to peer 
network, flowing as follows: 
 
                                               
       102   See Werbach, supra note 15, Ch. 1, The Trust Challenge, at 25-27 wherein he described an “Intermediary” 
as one connoted by the box as a “trust architecture,” with the intermediary taking “the place of social norms and 
government-issued laws to structure transactions.” Id. at 28 
       103    See id. 
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Graphic of a Blockchain network104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It may be a minor point, but it is unclear the real value of the funding portals, outside of 
centralizing an activity that will inevitably become decentralized, in its best case. 
Why would a company use these blockchain based digital tokens?  This method allows 
a business to create its own digital assets for sale to the public—similar to an initial public 
offering.105  These digital tokens are developed to reside on an issuing company’s own 
blockchain and can represent an asset or a utility, 106  a right to services and other goods, as well 
as a variety of other uses.107  Some companies are offering digital tokens because they seek to 
become a dominant competitive player in this developing innovation. Furthermore, blockchain 
based token offerings sold to Reg. CF investors are occasionally a testing ground for future 
initial coin offerings.108 
 
 
                                               
     104    See id. 
     105    See Dudgeon and Malna, supra note 95, at 6 (providing a definition and an explanation why ICOs are so 
popular globally). 
     106    See infra Part II(C).   
     107    See Rohr and Wright supra note 19, where they provide distinctions in different types of tokens reliant on 
blockchain technology: e.g. utility tokens, “which have both consumptive and speculative characteristics;” 
protocol tokens, which are tokens used “to compensate parties for participation in some activity that contributes 
to the blockchain and network” e.g. a token to the person(s) that validate cryptographic hash for a block; and app 
tokens which are “created by deploying a smart contract program on the Ethereum network.” Id. at 9, 14, 15, and 
20. 
     108   Michael R. Meadows, The Evolution of Crowdfunding: Reconciling Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial 
Coin Offerings, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 272, 273 (2018) (Meadows article focused principally on ICOs as a 
method of crowdfunding noting that “[w]hile ICOs serve as an effective method of raising capital, crypto-
crowdfunding may repackage traditional crowdfunding models that would otherwise trigger federal securities 
laws”). In their own right, initial coin offerings are a crowdfunding method used by companies to raise capital 
selling a digital asset (e.g. digital token) that utilize blockchain technology. 
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1. Digital Token Regulatory Controversy 
          Scholars argue that there are three categories of regulatory controversy: illegality, 
validity, and classification regarding the broader category called “cryptocurrency.”109 There are 
overlapping jurisdictions amongst federal regulators regarding the regulation of digital tokens, 
from the CFTC, the SEC, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice and the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”).110  One court has stated that the CFTC has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the SEC over the future of digital currencies.111  Recently, the SEC found that 
cryptocurrencies issued for the purpose of raising funds are securities and thus subject to 
securities laws.112  The SEC has also set up a new cyber security division which is issuing alerts 
for investors of coin offerings.113  The IRS continues with its exclusive jurisdiction over 
taxation of tokens and to the extent that a crime has been committed, the Department of Justice 
may intervene. Thus, to better understand the legality of the various questions, companies need 
to be counseled wisely about the laws of a variety of agency considerations. 
          With respect to classification, the current regulatory framework for digital tokens and 
cryptocurrencies has been described as a “fragmented, overlapping, and complex regulatory 
                                               
       109   Werbach, supra note 15, Ch. 9, We’re From the Government and We’re Here to Help, at 178. 
       110   Jai R. Massari et al., The Fragmented Regulatory Landscape for Digital Tokens, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/26/the-fragmented-regulatory-landscape-for-digital-tokens/; see also 
CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (entering a Preliminary Injunction Order against 
Defendants Patrick K. McDonnell and CabbageTech, Corp. d/b/a Coin Drop Markets (“CDM”) and affirming the 
CFTC’s January 18, 2018 complaint charging defendants with fraud and misappropriation in connection with 
purchases and trading of the virtual currencies Bitcoin and LiteCoin). 
       111     McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (affirming that CFTC has standing to exercise its enforcement power 
over fraud related to virtual currencies sold in interstate commerce and granting a preliminary injunction in favor 
of the CFTC). 
       112   Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: Operational Issues and Best 
Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS & FIN. 112, 116 n. 10 (2018); see also 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PUB. NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 
21(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 1 (2017) “THE 21 REPORT.” 
       113  Press Release, S.E.C., Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims (Aug. 28, 2017) 
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alert-public-companies-
making-ico-related (last visited on August 19, 2018). The SEC's Office of Investor Education and Advocacy issued 
an Investor Alert in August 2017 warning investors about scams of companies claiming to be engaging in initial 
coin offerings (ICO’s). 
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landscape.”114  treated as property for federal income tax purposes.115 Some argue that the use 
of a SAFT for the purchase of "pre-functional" tokens delivers a "functional" token that 
ultimately is not a security.116  Others argue the use of a SAFT likely muddies the analysis of 
whether a utility token is a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities law.117  
According to a recent SEC report, designated as the “21(a) Report,” the SEC applied 
longstanding securities law principles to demonstrate that a token constituted an investment 
contract, and therefore, was a security under U.S. federal securities laws.118  The SEC 
concluded that this DAO digital token offering represented an investment of money in a 
common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.119  It also noted that merely calling a token a 
“utility” token or structuring it to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a 
security.120  Applying the Howey test,121 the SEC argued that tokens and offerings that 
incorporate features and marketing efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others continue to contain the hallmarks of a security 
under U.S. law.122 
        However, while companies issue digital tokens under the safe harbor, it is not settled, 
the role of SEC’s ability to regulate in this market. SEC Chair Mary Jo White distinguished 
                                               
         114    Massari et al., supra note 110; see also Michael R. Meadows, Note, The Evolution of Crowdfunding: 
Reconciling Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial Coin Offerings, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 272, 272–73 
(2018). Meadows’ article focuses principally on ICOs as a method of crowdfunding. However, Meadows notes 
the “unique issues crypto-crowdfunding poses to participating consumers and regulatory authorities” and “with 
the emergence of blockchain technology, which adds an additional layer of complexity in determining whether 
federal securities laws apply to a crowdfunding campaign.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
      115    Notice, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (2014) 
      116    Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 10 
      117    Id. 
     118    THE 21 REPORT, SUPRA NOTE 112, at 15 (2017). See also Preston, supra note 48, at 322 (The Howey test 
can be refined to four factors to consider an investment contract a security: 1) “[i]t is an investment of money; 2) 
[t]he investment of money is in a common enterprise; 3) [a]ny profit comes from the efforts of a promotor or third 
party; and 4) [t]here is an expectation of profits from the investment.”).  
      119    Id., at 17–18  (2017). 
      120    Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, Public Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (last visited on October 5, 
2018)  
       121    SEC v. W.J. Howey Company, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
       122   Clayton, supra note 120, (“On this and other points where the application of expertise and judgment is 
expected, I believe that gatekeepers and others, including securities lawyers, accountants and consultants, need to 
focus on their responsibilities.  I urge you to be guided by the principal motivation for our registration, offering 
process and disclosure requirements:  investor protection and, in particular, the protection of our Main Street 
investors.”). 
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virtual currencies as not necessarily being a security, she also stated that interest and returns 
could be subject to securities regulation.123 In some respects, this topic is more multifarious 
than it would initially appear, because well publicized ICO offerings make up a much greater 
portion of initial coin offerings than do Reg. CF digital tokens.124  That being said, ICOs are 
being closely monitored by the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), 
and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).125  Reg. CF blockchain-based offerings on the 
other hand, are not monitored in the same way since companies file the required and periodic 
notices with the SEC including disclosure documents that include the predictions of risk 
affiliated with the offerings. 
The method by which digital tokens are offered and sold to investors varies in that the 
offerings “can take many different forms, and the rights and interests a coin is purported to 
provide the holder can vary.”126  Digital tokens have been offered to purchasers outside of the 
U.S. under Regulation S as long as the tokens do not flow back to the United States.127  The 
digital tokens can be registered, offered, and sold to shareholders under Rule 144128 of the 1933 
Act or under a safe harbor exemption (e.g. Reg. A, A+, Reg. D) as long as the company 
complies with the requirements of these alternatives.  
Since Reg. CF’s inception, over 1,100 companies—have offered over six hundred 
million dollars of securities to investors under Reg. CF.129  These amounts represent a sizable 
expansion in investment crowdfunding under these agency rules and rebuts the notion that few 
would use the exemption.130 A part of that growth is attributed to the surprising development 
of Reg. CF “digital token” or “blockchain based token” offerings, which represent a newer type 
                                               
       123    Nicolas Wenker, Online Currencies, Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise Bitcoin, 19 
Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 145, 180 (2014); See also Mark T. Williams, Beware of Bitcoin, Cognoscenti (Dec. 5, 2018),  
https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2013/12/05/bitcoin-currency-mark-t-williams (last retrieved on December 9, 
2018) 
       124    See infra Part II(C). 
       125  See Rohr, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that “the Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) and its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions have turned their attention to token sales”).  
       126   Clayton, supra note 120. 
       127    See Rohr, supra note 19, at 83 n. 219 (referencing Regulation S, 17 CFR Section 230.904 for offshore 
filings), with permission. 
       128    17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2012). 
       129   Details about the companies and total amounts raised in investment crowdfunding campaigns are 
discussed infra Part II(C). The total offerings do not include any amounts offered or raised in initial coin offerings 
(“ICO’s”) nor any amounts raised under other available securities exemptions, such as Regulation A+ or 
Regulation D.  Also, this figure does not represent success or failure in amounts actually raised under the campaign. 
       130   Of the 1,112 filings, several duplications were removed from the data. 
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of investment contracts distinguishable and seemingly more complex than prior investment 
contracts offered under Reg. CF. These type of token offerings are proliferating and being sold 
to investors and they are growing at a greater pace than traditional investment crowdfunding 
securities offerings. If the growth continues at this pace, these Reg. CF digital tokens will 
expand the type and quality of securities historically offered to investors.  
Digital tokens are being offered and sold through both investment contracts under Reg. 
CF131 and registered ICOs digital tokens.132  ICOs represent a significant number of the tokens 
sold outside of Reg. CF digital tokens.  However, digital tokens are also being offered and sold 
without registration, a method which is subject to enhanced scrutiny by the SEC and other state 
securities enforcement agencies.133  
Digital tokens are a more recent development in capital formation. 134  These offerings 
present yet another difference between crowdfunding and 1933 Act registered offerings.  On 
the one hand, these digital token offerings are a novel and innovative solution for company 
capital formation that appears to be intriguing members of the public.  In the short term, 
companies are beginning to raise money to launch their companies, advance the business’ 
mission, and satisfy the crowd’s healthy appetite to invest.  In that respect, investment 
                                               
       131    See infra Part II(C). 
       132    Not to be confused with registered initial coin offerings, digital tokens offered under Reg. CF are offered 
and sold in transactions exempt from federal securities laws governing the registration of securities offerings. 
There are a variety of securities laws that still apply to Reg. CF filings, including disclosures about the companies, 
insider trading, and limitations on the transactions allowed (e.g. amount offered by the issuer is under $1,070,000 
in any twelve-month period and small dollar amounts sold to investors). Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity 
Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n (May 13, 2016),  
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#_ftn1. This article seeks to address the 
scope and effect of token offering campaigns on companies and their investors and to provide recommendations 
as to how regulators may want to rethink Reg. CF investment crowdfunding in light of developments in Reg. CF 
token offerings. 
       133   Brian Fung, State Regulators Unveil Nationwide Crackdown On Suspicious Cryptocurrency Investment 
Schemes, WASHINGTON POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/05/21/state-regulators-unveil-nationwide-crackdown-on-suspicious-cryptocurrency-investment-
schemes/?utm_term=.e342d426441b (“Securities regulators across the United States and Canada announced 
dozens of investigations . . . into potentially deceitful cryptocurrency investment products, the largest 
coordinated crackdown to date by state and provincial officials on bitcoin scams . . . The state agencies are also 
pursuing suspicious cases of initial coin offerings, or ICOs, a fundraising technique used by both legitimate and 
illegitimate cryptocurrency projects in ways that resemble initial public offerings of stock.”). 
       134   See infra Part II(C); see also Knyazeva, supra note 40 (regarding Reg. A financing: states that as of 
October 31, 2016, prospective issuers had publicly filed offering statements for 147 Reg A+ offerings, for $2.6 
billion in financing). Of the exempt filings, Reg. D offerings for 2016 had 23,292 offerings totaling over $2 Trillion 
dollars. See Jonathan Nieh, Update on Regulation D: Data from 2016 Form D’s, CROWDFUND INSIDER (April 19, 
2017), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/04/97876-update-regulation-d-data-2016-form-ds/. 
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crowdfunding via Reg. CF shows promising signs of being an innovative bridge towards the 
goal of capital formation.  However, if issuing a token was as simple as providing a consumer 
good to an interested buyer, the story would be over.  The coins might be located next to a 
comic book or beanie baby collection and no-one would care.  However, there is a variety to 
the characteristics of digital tokens.  A digital token could be a functional utility used to 
consume a product or service, as an investment security with possible growth potential, or as a 
commodity like gold or silver.135  
It is important to note a few distinctions in ICO digital tokens and Reg. CF blockchain 
based tokens.  To put the two in perspective, one should first understand the varying volumes 
of the offering activity over the past few years.  First, Rohr and Wright reported that in 2016, 
less than $100 million in ICO digital tokens were sold, but by October 2017, that number grew 
to over $3.7 billion.136  Current estimates show that by March 2018, ICO digital tokens 
continued to grow rapidly to $11.3 billion dollars, with a single, $1.7 billion transaction by a 
company named Telegram.137  However, the top 100 cryptocurrencies sold globally have a 
market capitalization of over $208 billion, with BITCOIN having a market capitalization of 
$112.7 billion in September 2018138 and down to $58 billion by December 6, 2018.139 
Growing rapidly but at a lesser magnitude than ICO digital tokens, are Reg. CF digital 
tokens, didn’t begin selling at all until the Fall of 2017.140  The offerings then grew to $22 
million between November 2017 and the end of June 30, 2018.141  Relatively speaking, there is 
no real comparison with the global explosion that has taken place between ICO digital tokens 
and Reg. CF digital tokens.  Reg. CF digital tokens are a small, but growing part of the token 
                                               
       135    See infra Part II(C). 
       136    See Rohr, supra note 19, at 4. 
       137   David Floyd, $6.3 Billion: 2018 ICO Funding Has Passed 2017's Total, COINDESK (April 19, 2018), 
https://www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-funding-already-outpaced-2017/ (noting that in just the first 
quarter of 2018, $6.3 billion dollars of ICO digital tokens were raised, representing 118% of the 2017 total of $5 
billion.). 
       138  COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited on Sept. 6, 2018). But cf., Kyle Torpey, 
Comparing Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies by ‘Market Cap’ Can Be Very Misleading, FORBES (Dec. 29, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ktorpey/2017/12/29/comparing-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies-by-
market-cap-can-be-very-misleading/#62cbdb832509 (“Many cryptocurrency traders track the price of these digital 
assets on sites like CoinMarketCap.com, but the key metric that is most often used to compare these 
cryptocurrencies, market cap, can sometimes be misleading.”). 
      139    See, Finance.yahoo.com BTC-USD – Bitcoin USD (last retrieved on December 6, 2018). 
      140    See infra Part II(C). 
      141  See infra Part II(C). 
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expansion.  However, what distinguishes these offerings is that the Reg. CF investors are 
members of the public, not necessarily sophisticated investors. 
To determine whether digital tokens offered under Reg. CF are investment contracts 
and thus, potentially a security, one would look to the Howey standard.142  Under the Howey  
standard, whether there is an "investment contract" under the Securities Act depends on 
“whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to 
come solely from the efforts of others”; “[i]f that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the 
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without 
intrinsic value.”143    
Multiple federal and state agencies are pondering just how digital tokens should be 
classified and the extent to which agencies should regulate them or not. Historically, the 1933 
Act creates private rights of action to aid the enforcement of obligations pertaining to securities 
offerings.144  Towards that end, the SEC has recently appointed Valerie A. Szczepanik to the 
SEC Division of Corporation Finance with oversight of the securities laws and digital asset 
technologies.145  Additionally, “[t]he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . which regulates not 
the original issuance of securities but all their subsequent trading, is[]enforceable through 
private rights of action.”146  The SEC is currently monitoring digital tokens as possible 
securities within the larger category of digital assets.147  “Digital tokens . . . can represent units 
of value, which may make them look more like commodities.”148 
Digital tokens have been distinguished from currency, “the coin and paper money of the 
United States or any other country that is designated as legal tender and that circulates and is 
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance,” to the 
                                               
      142    SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
      143    Id. at 301. 
      144    See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018). 
      145 See, SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation. Szczepanik also 
named Associate Director in Division of Corporation Finance, Press Release, June 4, 2018 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-102 (last visited on August 6, 2018). Szczepanik’s new role is to 
“coordinate efforts across all SEC Divisions and Offices regarding the application of U.S. securities laws to 
emerging digital asset technologies and innovations, including Initial Coin Offerings and cryptocurrencies.” Id. 
      146    The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.) 
is a law governing the secondary trading of securities (stocks, bonds, and debentures) in the United States of 
America. See also Cyan, 138 S. Ct., at 1062. 
      147    See Mokhtarian, supra note 112. 
      148    See Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 70. 
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extent that the digital currency “does not have any legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”149  
Bitcoin is an example of this currency distinction:  it is not considered a currency in the United 
States since it lacks the recognition by any state.150 
Brian Quintenz of the CFTC has spoken on the complexity of the classification of 
tokens: 
However, just because a product is tokenized does not change its underlying 
qualities.  For example, if Disney World were to tokenize the admissions to 
its theme parks, those tokens would still be tickets. Tokenizing the tickets 
does not make them currencies and it does not make them securities. It makes 
them tickets.  Similarly, tokenizing a security does not change the fact that it 
is a security.151 
Quintenz further explained why he thought there might be a frenzy around digital 
tokens: 
As I postulated two days ago at the City Week conference in London, I see 
three main motivations for the broader tokenization revolution. One 
motivation for a company or entity to tokenize a product is purely as a 
marketing ploy—to take advantage of the popular and speculative mania 
surrounding all things “token.” . . . A second motivation to create a token is 
to enable and realize the efficiency of the blockchain construct in assigning 
and tracking ownership. This is having, and will continue to have, an impact 
on title transfer and settlement processes.  Think of this as the back office 
tokenization revolution. Lastly, a third motivation is to utilize the 
transferability of tokens to create a secondary market for any and all non-
tangible things—the eBay of Intangibles so to speak—for rights, services, 
permissions, etc., that the seller allows to be transferred between parties.152 
 
                                               
      149     U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, 
Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, 1 (March 18, 2018), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
       150    Gregory M. Karch, Bitcoin, the Law and Emerging Public Policy: Towards a 21st Century Regulatory 
Scheme, 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 193, 231 (2014); see also Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Cryptocurrencies and 
the Uniform Commercial Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 U. OF P. R. BUS. L. J.129, 132–34 (2017). 
       151   U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC), Remarks of Commissioner Brian Quintenz before 
the Eurofi High Level Seminar 2018, (Apr. 26, 2018) 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11 (last visited Oct. 7, 2018); 
       152   Id. Commissioner Quintenz also complimented the secondary market development: “Empowering a 
secondary market’s price discovery and valuation functions for products that were previously untransferable—
such as extra storage space on a home computer—is a fascinating development.” Id. 
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Because violations of Section 5 may result in rescission, cautious companies proceed 
gingerly by filing under the Reg. CF exemption.153  Commissioner Quintenz noted the 
transformative nature of coins in ICO transactions, stating that “[t]hey may start their life as a 
security from a capital-raising perspective but then at some point . . . turn into a commodity.”154  
In the next section, we discuss the rationale and methodology for this research study and what 
can be learned from investment crowdfunding data. 
          The growth of digital tokens in Reg. CF offerings raises three troubling concerns.  First, 
Reg. CF digital tokens are showing a greater momentum than other Reg. CF offerings.  As a 
digital token could have different characteristics, an investor would need to review the 
particular description very closely.  Consider Rohr and Wright’s argument that tokens lack 
“homogeneity.’’155 Query, what then are investors purchasing?  Moreover, as digital tokens are 
being sold to investors to finance unbuilt technological funding portals and services for future 
initial coin offering transactions, Reg. CF investors are taking the greatest risks of loss.  These 
unsophisticated and non-accredited investors are subject to a set of different investor 
qualifications and resale restrictions than ICO transactions, which are being closely monitored 
by the SEC.  Not so much the case with digital token offerings under Reg. CF.  
          Second, the company disclosures contain the standard legend and the risks of investing 
in these type of transactions: 
 
A crowdfunding investment involves risk.  An investor should not invest any 
funds in this [o]ffering unless he or she can afford to lose his or her entire 
investment.  In making an investment decision, investors must rely on their 
own examination of the [i]ssuer and the terms of the [o]ffering, including the 
                                               
       153 Indeco, Regulation Crowdfunding Offering Memorandum Part II, (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1722197/000172219718000005/indeco1.pdf. Indeco CEO explains 
why his company had enough concerns to proceed and file with the Securities Exchange Commission. He took the 
position that the token offering could be considered something other than a “utility” and more likely a “security.” 
Id. See also Indeco Launces First Token Pre-Sale under SEC’s Regulation Crowdfunding Rules, MEDIUM (Dec. 
5, 2017), https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-regulation-crowdfunding-
rules-e82dad79345 
       154   Lukas Schor, Explaining The “Simple Agreement for Future Tokens” Framework, MEDIUM (Nov. 29, 
2017) https://medium.com/@argongroup/explaining-the-simple-agreement-for-future-tokens-framework-
15d5e7543323 (describing Commissioner Quintenz’ statement as “probably the most specific comment by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regarding the classification of ICO’s and shows quite well the bipolar 
nature of many tokens”). 
       155    See Rohr, supra note 19, at 2. 
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merits and risks involved. . . . These securities have not been recommended 
or approved by any federal or state securities commission or regulatory 
authority.  Furthermore, these authorities have not passed upon the accuracy 
or adequacy of this document.  The SEC does not pass upon the merits of 
any [s]ecurities offered or the terms of the [o]ffering, nor does it pass upon 
the accuracy or completeness of any offering document or literature.  These 
Securities are offered under an exemption from registration; however, the 
SEC has not made an independent determination that these securities are 
exempt from registration.156  
 
Other Reg. CF offerings, go further outlining some of the risks of investing in blockchain based 
tokens: 
The chain code concept, the underlying software application and software 
platform . . . is still in an early development stage and unproven.  There is 
no warranty or assurance that the process for creating [] Tokens will be 
uninterrupted or error-free and there is an inherent risk that the software 
could contain defects, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, bugs or viruses causing 
the complete loss of [] contributions and/or [] Tokens.  Additionally, there 
are other risks associated with the acquisition, storage, transfer and use of [] 
Tokens, including those that . . . may not be [anticipated].  Such risks may 
further materialize as unanticipated variations or combinations of the 
risks.157  
 
          The research begs the question why anyone after reading these disclaimers would invest 
in digital token offerings?  If the blockchain token concept does not materialize, it is likely that 
the companies seeking to use them will not have adequate funding to repay the obligation and 
the investors may lose all or a portion of their investment.  
          Third, the SEC needs to rethink how to advise unsophisticated investors, who may not 
have an income to fall back on if the investment fails as do accredited investors.158  It is 
uncertain whether the underlying premise for the offerings will create a framework for “digital 
                                               
       156    See Pokeology, Crowdfunding Offering Statement, NEXTSEED, at 14 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1720051/000172005117000001/document1.pdf 
       157 Blockchain for Delayed Flights, TRUSTABIT, at 24, https://trustabit.io/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/TrustaBit-final.pdf. 
       158   Another common disclaimer in offering memorandum of Reg. CF offerings is “[a] crowdfunding 
investment involves risk. An investor should not invest any funds in this Offering unless he or she can afford to 
lose his or her entire investment.” See Pokeology, supra note 156, at 14. 
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assets used in connection with decentralized services, applications, and communities.”159  As 
promising as these offerings may be, digital token are fundamentally based on a theoretical 
idea.  
          While federal agencies and the courts sort out their respective roles in regulating 
cryptocurrencies,160 there is a quiet digital token revolution occurring within smaller Reg. CF 
campaigns.   
 
       B.  Digital Token Research and Summary of Findings 
 
 
1. Rationale and Methodology for Research Study 
 
There is an ongoing need for federal and state agencies, companies, and investors, to 
analyze available data to assess the current state of capital formation and employment under 
this new regulation.  A better understanding of the offerings and transactions that have 
transpired over the past several years would provide a template for future successful offerings, 
better investor protection, and better crafted regulatory policies aimed at accomplishing the 
normative goals of the regulations.  In this Part, we explain the methodology behind the 
research project. 
This research study sought to determine if the impacts of Reg. CF regulations have been 
worthy of lament or applause. To determine those effects, we turn to researching available data. 
After undertaking a review of the prior SEC Edgar Data, this Article provides information, 
findings and analysis relating to Reg. CF campaigns in the United States.161  Researchers 
retrieved and reviewed 1,112 SEC Form C notice filings and other SEC filings completed by 
companies from Reg. CF’s adoption date through June 30, 2018.  
 
                                               
       159    Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework, PROTOCOL 
LABS, at 1 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf.  
       160  There are a variety of proposals regarding how each agency could consider regulating, however that is not 
the subject this article.  The author does take the position that it is time for Congress to recognize that digital 
currencies are blooming in the United States and globally.  Congressional clarity on the digital currencies would 
be useful. 
       161    See Form C et al., supra note 14. 
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         From May 2016 through June 30, 2018, companies filed 1,112 Form C notice filings in 
Reg. CF transactions,162 offering over six-hundred million dollars of securities to investors.  
These Form C filings provide critical data about the companies that seek to offer equity, debt 
and investment contracts, the funding portals that provide the portal structure, and the 
transactions that are offered to the crowd of potential investors.   
A proactive monitoring of data can illustrate the growth, success and failures of 
companies, valuable information to help policy makers continue to accurately set state and 
federal policy designed to enhance innovation nationwide as well as protect investors.163  This 
research provides insights on what has transpired since the adoption of Reg. CF.  Further, the 
Article analyzes the crowdfunding marketplace and highlights emerging developments and 
trends; along with insights on Reg. CF’s impact on innovation.  
The data included digitally filed responses to the following questions:  
Q1.  Company Demographics: Describe the names, incorporation location and principal 
office of companies registering investment offerings under the Crowdfunding Act.164 
 
Q2.  Offering Details: Type of security; Target offering; Minimum offering and maximum 
offering; data to quantify the amount of securities offered per period and over time.  
 
Q3. Funding Portal Details: Description of the name of the funding portal or self-funder 
for each offering and the compensation terms. 
 
Q4.  Employee Details: The number of employees the company disclosed on Form C. 
 
Q5. Aggregate Amount of capital sought by companies disclosed on Form C. 
 
          There are limits to the data collection from the SEC Edgar database, in several respects. 
First, data on Edgar would not include unregistered investment crowdfunding campaigns. 
Unregistered campaigns could stem from other allowed securities transactions exempt under 
                                               
       162  Of the 1,112 Form C filings, several were excluded because of duplication, a subsequent withdrawal of 
the filing or a request filed as a Form C, but merely an extension of the timeframes.  
      163    E.g. Parsont, supra note 22, at 341 (recommending that the SEC generate empirical data and conduct a 
special study on capital-raising impediments and investor protection).  
      164 Additionally, for each company, the Central Index Key (“CIK”) was also noted. The CIK is a unique, 
public number that is assigned to each entity that submits filings to the SEC. Use of the CIK allows the SEC to 
differentiate between filing entities with similar names. 
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other sections of the Securities laws, such as ICO’s, IPO’s or other Reg. D and 33Act filings. 
Alternatively, the securities may not register because the transaction is exempt under a state-
level intrastate crowdfunding exemption. There could conceivably be campaigns that 
companies are choosing not to register anywhere for various ill-advised reasons. Also, several 
foreign registrants with principal offices located in the United States are not be included in the 
choice of entity location data. 
The research in this Article differed from earlier work in that it was not seeking to assess 
the success or failure of any particular offerings, or the totality of the success of the offerings, 
or to make a prediction about whether scholars could call this investment crowdfunding era a 
success.  Rather, the intention was to frame what we can infer about the scope of investment 
crowdfunding and to provide insights and learnings about the information retrieved.165  To that 
end, evaluation of the data provides insights on: investment crowdfunding’s momentum; the 
companies that had sought capital from investors; the intermediation of the 
securities/transactions; geographical scope, choice of entity and notable inferences about the 
type of securities that were offered to investors.  As mentioned before, since digital tokens were 
noted, more detail was provided on these securities. 
 
2. Definition of Success 
         Accomplishing the normative goals of job creation, access to capital, inclusion, and 
efficiency would generally be thought of as success under Reg. CF.  More research, over time, 
is needed to determine whether the regulations have succeeded in goal attainment. For purposes 
of this research project, the author defines success by three measures – company engagement, 
the amount of capital actually raised, and the investors successfully obtaining a positive return 
on their investment.  The level of company engagement in offering capital under Reg. CF is 
important because if companies are not utilizing this safe harbor exemption then it is obsolete 
and serves no purpose. If they are turning to this form of investment crowdfunding, then at least 
they are engaging. Another successful outcome would be for these companies to  raise capital 
and put that capital to use to create jobs and undertake their operations. If shareholders are not 
receptive to company offerings, then again the regulations are of no utility. Also, as important 
                                               
      165   Within scope, one might assess risks and rewards. However, the results of many of the campaigns are 
still ongoing. Thus, assessing the risks and rewards could be the subject of a future article. 
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is that investors are successful and that is defined as likelihood of a positive return on 
investment. 
      In addition to the number of companies participating and the level of the transactions, 
the number of funding portals would provide insights about the developing story of investment 
crowdfunding.  If many companies wanted to seek capital through Reg. CF, but there were no 
funding portals to help them accomplish the objective, we would be discussing the dreams and 
hopes of what Reg. CF could be.  However, funding portals is its own story, as further discussed 
below. 
 
3. Summary of the Findings 
 
a. Momentum in Investment Crowdfunding  
    There is an overlap in the recent discussions about emerging FinTech and its effect on 
legal theory and society.  FinTech-enabled transactions include tools of contracting and 
commerce.166  Consequently, it is hard to imagine that investment crowdfunding on internet 
funding portals would not to be considered within that definition or an expansion of that 
definition.  There is much to be learned about the funding portals that are provided for the 
companies to raise money and their role in educating investors about transactions.  
By analyzing SEC Edgar data concerning the funding portals that provide the internet 
funding portals for the securities, new revelations and inferences are possible.  The Form C 
filings reveal which funding portal is hosting the offering and their respective costs of doing 
the transactions. Also, the data illustrates the level of a “funding portal’s choice” in the type of 
transactions a funding portal may choose to support. Professor Schwartz’s distinctions drawn 
between the United States and New Zealand undergird the tension between efficiency versus 
inclusion.167 The data hint at levels of influence that may minimize inclusion in investment 
crowdfunding while enhancing efficiencies for the funding portal.  Further, the analysis also 
provides data about the funding portal’s choice of company transactions around the country.  
                                               
       166 Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV., 61, 77 (2018) (arguing that 
FinTech has a broad definition and is divided into three types, especially in the consumer area: efficient 
information gathering and monitoring; tools of contracting and commerce; and enforcement and dispute resolution 
tools). 
     167    See generally Schwartz, supra note 11, at 885–86. 
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Data is provided on the funding portals and their intermediation. One trend noted is a 
trend towards efficiency, as fewer funding portals handle a greater portion of the transactions.  
At the same time, as investment crowdfunding campaigns are growing, there is also are more 
funding portals responsible doing a few transactions.  The investment crowdfunding geographic 
concentrations and dispersal are noted by Professor Magnuson as a form of “diffusion” in the 
Fintech Markets.168  Magnuson argues that FinTech has “defied [the] conventional 
understanding” of concentration of financial markets.169  In Fintech markets, the players have 
“smaller sections of the market, focus on narrow industry areas, and often are made up of a 
number of nimble start-ups . . . or even computer servers.”170  From the data collected, between 
2017 and 2018, funding portals have increasing concentrations of deals, while at the same time, 
there are more funding portals, that are hosting a greater number of the campaigns. A future 
research project could evaluate the role and impact of this level of funding portal concentration 
and dispersion on business capital formation. The role of funding portals and how they  advance 
inclusion.   
          Reg. CF digital token offerings sold to investors are growing at a greater pace than 
traditional investment crowdfunding securities offerings.  If the growth continues at this pace, 
these Reg. CF digital tokens will expand the type and quality of securities historically offered 
to investors.  The Reg. CF digital tokens are also disrupting the investment marketplace, as 
these initial transactions are a leverage to other, future initial coin offerings (“ICOs” or “initial 
coin offerings”).  This development may provide both potentially positive and negative 
disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on the success of blockchain 
technology.       
         Despite the market’s infancy, findings suggest that investment crowdfunding some has 
enjoyed sustained momentum. There is greater breadth in the number of companies performing 
these publicly offered crowdfunding campaigns. Campaigns can be measured by increasing 
numbers of company principal office locations throughout the country, increasing amounts and 
type of securities offerings, and increasing variety in the companies that are participating.  Since 
                                               
     168   William J. Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J. L., BUS., AND FIN., (forthcoming 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstracts=3148036. 
     169    Id. 
     170    Id. 
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Reg. CF’s inception, over 1,100 companies have offered over six hundred million dollars of 
securities to investors under Reg. CF.  These amounts represent a sizable expansion in 
investment crowdfunding under these regulations which rebuts the notion that few would use 
the exemption. 
 
b.  Securities and Digital Token Risk 
   
Investors have had the opportunity to invest in a variety of companies’ securities 
offerings.  Investors in Reg. CF offerings need not be accredited, wealthy, or financially 
sophisticated,171 to participate in these transactions.  Investors can invest amounts ranging from 
$2,000 to $107,000 in a 12-month period depending on their income and net worth.172  
Securities offerings have ranged from traditional common and preferred stock offerings, to less 
traditional options like convertible debt, membership and partnership units, investment 
contracts, and digital tokens. The SEC considers investment crowdfunding investments as 
exempt from registration, and the securities have resale restrictions that raise liquidity issues.173  
The type of securities that investors may buy from company crowdfunding campaigns 
and the risks that may flow from these agreements are important lines of legal research.  Legal 
inquiry into business transactions is different from business inquiry regarding the transactions.  
In a business inquiry, one would want to know whether the company has good fundamentals,174 
whether it is a good business risk, and whether the market conditions are right for this particular 
type of venture so that the investor can receive a return on his or her investment.  Evaluating 
the text of securities and investment contracts in order to determine legality and risk is the realm 
of securities lawyers and tax professionals. 
                                               
       171 North American Securities Administrators Administration, Informed Advisory: Crowdfunding, Who Can 
Invest?, (July 24, 2018) http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfunding/ (last visited  Oct. 
27, 2018). 
       172 Id. Hypothetically, an investor could invest $0.25 or larger dollar amounts offered by issuers. Most deals 
have larger entry points for investment. For example, although a share may cost .25 cents per share, a minimum 
contribution might be 100 shares, resulting in a $25 investment. 
       173    15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2015). See also Regulation Crowdfunding Release Nos. 33-9974, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2018). 
       174 Business fundamentals might include: due diligence regarding the proof of concept, a viable business 
plan, the leadership and human resources, the finances and profitability, the product/service, promotion and the 
place. 
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There is a level of uncertainty and risk with a company offering digital tokens based on 
the blockchain for both the company and the investor. The classification of these type of 
securities is unsettled with questions as to whether the digital tokens are securities, commodities 
or utilities. This leads to concerns about actual investment outcomes for the investors who range 
from the sophisticated to the unsophisticated, and from the accredited to the non-accredited. In 
Form C filings, companies are required to identify risks that are specific to the business and its 
financial condition.175  Generally, companies disclose language relating to risks of an economic 
downturn, political events, and technological developments (such as hacking and the ability or 
inability to prevent hacking).176  Enhanced risks for early-stage companies that are greater than 
the typical risk of a startup, is another cause of concern.177  
           There are a variety of other types of information that are retrievable from the data, 
including geographical data, choice of entity, and principal office locations.  Only a brief 
summary of the data concerning geographic location of all investment crowdfunding 
transactions is included in this Article.  The scope of the geographical investment crowdfunding 
data may have broader implications regarding the reasons why capital blackouts in areas around 
the country are occurring. Also, jurisdiction and principal office location is a robust topic, 
which also can be covered in a broader research paper.  
 
c. Company Choice of Entity and Principal Offices 
 
 This research study did not retrieve incorporation or organizational documents.  
However, what is apparent from the Form C notice filings is that a larger concentration of 
companies select Delaware as the preferred choice of entity than in 2016.178  Choice of entity 
                                               
       175    Form C, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 
2018). 
       176    See, e.g., Mobile Spike Form C, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674319/000167431916000003/mobilespikeformc.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2018). 
       177    See Patrick McCarney, Note, False Start: Carving a Niche for Established Small Business 
Participation in Regulation Crowdfunding Rules Designed for Startups, 51 IND. L. REV. 277, 296 (2018). 
       178 See infra Part II(C). More research would be needed to determine the reasons for this flight to Delaware.  
It could be a function of larger deals, herd behavior, or other legal, business and tax considerations. See also 
Magnuson, supra note 168, at 22 (explaining reasons for herd behavior in Fintech markets). “This may occur in 
several different ways, but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs sharing certain programming 
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provides context to the law applying to “the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible 
charter and bylaw terms, and shareholder voting rights,” which are “considerations controlled 
by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation has any real 
economic ties to that location.”179  Empirical work on choice of entity also can “illuminate how 
parties actually behave” and how the “parties would be likely to behave in response to legal 
rules.”180  Professor Cherry notes that corporations engage in races to the bottom, not only in 
selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern their internal corporate affairs, but 
in labor and regulatory considerations as well.181  
             In the context of digital coin disputes, choice of entity will likely be an important 
jurisdictional question.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cyan v. Beaver County 
Employees Retirement Fund,182 permitted some claims under the 1933 Act to be brought in 
state courts (as well as federal courts).  The private bar has predicted that there will be a surge 
in state court filings asserting that initial coin offerings contain materially false information.183  
A second federal judge in the Northern District of California, cited Cyan, recently .184  These 
decisions provide state courts with authority to proceed on a variety of claims brought by civil 
litigators, including claims under Section 10(b)5.185  Companies offering securities under Reg. 
CF are not exempt from these securities law provisions, even though the transactions are 
smaller in size. Consequently, there is a growing preference toward a Delaware incorporation. 
Last, the Reg. CF offerings are mostly concentrated as common stock, simple agreements for 
equity, convertible debt offerings, with an emerging trend in digital tokens.  
                                               
templates. If an algorithm proves successful in the market, other actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate 
the algorithm.” Id. 
       179  Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and 
Bylaws, 104 GEO. L. J., 583, 597 (2016). 
      180    Kyle Chen, et al., Empirical Study Redux on Choice of Law and Forum in M&A: The Data and its Limits, 
16 J. BUS. & SEC. L., Fall 2015, at 1, 31–32. 
      181    Miriam Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GEORGIA L. REV., 951, 960–61 (2011). 
      182    Cyan, Inc. et al. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018). 
      183    Douglas Flaum, et al. ICO Battlefields Proliferate: Preparing for Private Litigation and Regulation Now, 
THE RECORDER, (Apr. 27, 2018) https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/04/27/ico-battlefields-proliferate-
preparing-for-private-litigation-and-regulation-now/?slreturn=20180813122201 (noting the role of the private bar 
to “flesh out the application of long-standing legal concepts to the novel issues raised”); See, e.g., Wildes v. 
Bitconnect International PLC, No. 18-cv-80086 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2018). 
      184    Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, No. 17-cv-06850 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018). 
      185    Flaum, supra note 183, at 4 (“[T]he Cyan ruling not only gives plaintiffs a choice of forums in Securities 
Act claims, but potentially allows for multiple concurrent actions regarding the same ICO—an outcome that not 
only leads to the potential of inconsistent rulings, but certainly will increase the cost of defending this type of 
litigation.”). 
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d. Investment Crowdfunding Generally 
Studying the Reg. CF parties, funding portals and offerings provides a better 
understanding of whether the normative goals set forth by the Crowdfund Act have been 
attained.  When we consider what the data means, the conversation quickly becomes normative.  
Is Reg. CF the best way for companies to form capital?  Is there a better way to create jobs than 
this current investment crowdfunding framework?  To the extent the data defies our thinking 
about what is happening in investment crowdfunding markets, without more research, we will 
not be able to know for sure whether the positive story is as good as it gets, because these small 
companies could not raise any more money than they did under Reg. CF. Alternatively, is the 
negative story merely the flip side of a positive story because companies not using Reg. CF 
found other alternatives financing opportunities to their capital needs? 
There appears to be a limited benefit in Reg. CF offerings, which is illustrated in the 
next section.  What we know is that investors have historically been able to invest in large 
enterprises and those investments have produced both social and economic benefits (and losses) 
for the companies and the shareholders. That data is highlighted daily with disclosures to the 
SEC, and articles in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Forbes and Barron. Further, 
what we also know is that accredited and sophisticated investors have been able to invest in 
companies that file under a variety of safe harbor exemptions and under the 1933 Act and that 
startups still have trouble raising capital. Companies that have these investors available to them 
could tap into other safe harbor exemptions and file under Reg. A or Reg. D. 
Consequently, it appears that the major benefit of Reg. CF investment crowdfunding is 
to provide a place where companies can tap into the general public of unsophisticated or 
unaccredited investors.  If these companies had access to sophisticated or accredited investors, 
they likely would file under another safe harbor exemptions.  The fact that the general public 
is solicited is one reason that regulators should evaluate what is actually being offered to 
investors. In the next section, the author provides additional details about the data that provides 
information on the growth in investment crowdfunding and more specifically, digital tokens. 
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C. Shedding Light on Data  
 
1. Quantum Thought? 
 
There is quantitative data and then there is the meaning that we assert about the data. 
After reviewing the data, the idea of Nick Szabo resonates, 
 
“…quantum thought, as I call it -- although it already has  
a traditional name less recognizable to the modern ear,  
scholastic thought -- demands that we simultaneously consider  
often mutually contradictory possibilities.”186 
 
The next portion of this article, sets forth the data of the study.  The terms that apply to them 
might vary depending on the party interpreting the data. Is the idea that over $600 million 
dollars was offered under Reg. CF a cause to celebrate or does it show that Reg. CF offerings 
pale in comparison to the broader ICO, IPO markets?  When we look at the growth 
progression of digital tokens, we could hypothesize that there is a 500% growth in digital 
token offerings, year over year.  Yet, the total aggregate numbers of digital token offerings 
remain small in comparison to investment crowdfunding generally or the larger ICO coin 
offerings.    The same reasoning could be applied to the data that relates to the progress of 
funding portals throughout the country.  Arguable, more funding portals are developing across 
the nation.  However, there are pockets where there no funding portals and some funding 
portals primarily offer digital tokens, which may or may not be the best investment for 
unsophisticated investors. Thus, normative claims about what is happening is reserved more 
study and a better understanding that will come with time.   
 
Below are a series of Charts that capture the data from the research study: 
                                               
       186 Nick Szabo, “More Short Takes,” Unenumerated, July 1, 2012, 
http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2012/07/more-short-takes.html. Tom Robert Shaw, Practicing Quantum 
Thought (August 14, 2017), states that to practice quantum thought, one is reminded that “no matter how confident 
we are, we should be the first to question our own point of view” and affirming statements of Nick Szabo, “we can 
be both for and against a proposition because we can be considering at least two significantly possible but 
inconsistent hypotheses, or because we favour some parts of ideas but not others” 
https://tomrobertshaw.net/2017/08/practicing-quantum-thought/ (last visited on December 9, 2018). 
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FINDING A1: ESTIMATED $600 MILLION INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING 
OFFERINGS 2016-2018 (SEE CHART 1). 
 
Chart 1 – Investment Crowdfunding All Reg. CF Offerings 2016 – 2018 
 
May-Dec.2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June2017 - $131.6 Million;  
July-Dec2017 - $173.36 Million; Jan-June2018 - $215.5 Million Dollars 
 
 
FINDING A2: GROWTH PROGRESSION NOTED IN 2017 (SEE CHART 2). 
 
Chart 2  – Investment Crowdfunding Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth Progression 
  
Chart: May-Dec.2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June2017 - $131.6 Million; July-Dec2017 - $173.36 Million;               
Jan-June2018 - $215.5 Million Dollars 
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FINDING A3: BY 2018, DELAWARE AS CHOICE OF ENTITY PREFERRED  
(SEE CHART 3). 
 
Chart 3  –  2018 Company Choice of Entity compared to 2016 Choice of Entity 
 
Chart: *Pennsylvania and Virginia were tied for 7th place 
 
FINDING A4: DELAWARE PREFERRED AS THE CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR 
DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS (SEE CHART 4). 
Chart 4  –  2018 Company Choice of Entity for Digital Token offerings 
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2.  From SAFE to Blockchain Based Digital Tokens 
 
           In this section, we explore how digital tokens have been characterized in the Reg. CF 
offerings between 2016 and 2018 and the scope of the offerings.   
Companies included over $22 million-worth of Reg. CF securities offerings with tokens 
in investment crowdfunding offerings beginning in November of 2017 through June 2018. 
These new digital token investment contracts have increased by five hundred percent starting 
in 2017 to 2018.  Considering there were no Reg. CF digital tokens in 2016, they have increased 
two thousand percent since 2016.  
It is important to note that the vast number of digital tokens offered throughout the United 
States are not offered under Reg. CF.  There is a larger spectrum of all Reg. CF campaigns, in 
comparison to initial coin offering campaigns.  Reg. CF digital token transactions remain a 
small, albeit important, slice of capital raising.  To better understand this point, it is best to view 
the spectrum graphically.  Between 2016 and 2018, companies sought to raise over $615 million 
dollars under Reg. CF–of that amount, $22.2 million related to digital tokens.  Estimates 
graphically illustrate that digital tokens currently are less than 3% of total Reg. CF offerings. 
 
a.  Growth of Digital Tokens in Reg. CF 
FINDING B1: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL IN COMPARISON TO ALL 
REG. CF INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS (SEE CHART 5). 
 
Chart 5 - All Reg. CF offerings, $615 Million; digital token offerings, $22.2 Million; and  
All Other Reg. CF Campaigns  (Equity and Debt), $598 Million. 
 
 
 
Also, to understand the context of Reg. CF digital token offerings in comparison to 
initial coin offerings, the next graph illustrates that the aggregate dollar amount of Reg. CF 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Reg. CF Token Offerings
All Reg. CF Offerings (Non Tokens)
2016-2018 Reg. CF digital tokens Compared to 
All Other Reg. CF Offerings (in millions)
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digital token offerings is exceedingly small compared to the aggregate dollar amount of ICO 
offerings.  In fact, Reg. CF digital tokens, representing over $22 million in offerings, are less 
than .2% of total coin offerings. 
 
FINDING B2: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL IN COMPARISON TO ICO 
OFFERINGS OF $11.3 BILLION (SEE CHART 6). 
   
Chart 6 - Composite of estimated coin offerings, including ICO’s ($11.3 Billion), All Reg. CF 
offerings ($620 million) of which digital token offerings ($22.2)  – Comparison 
 
 
 
Considering this context, digital token offerings under Reg. CF could be considered small in 
comparison to the movement currently happening with ICOs.  These small digital tokens are 
providing early stage companies capital to launch later stage transactions. 
 During the first six months of 2018, over $16.9 million of securities were offered with 
digital assets tied to blockchain, otherwise described as Reg. CF digital tokens.  For the six-
month period in 2018, there is a developing second phase of investment contracts.  In the first 
phase, investment crowdfunding transactions included SAFEs and revenue-sharing 
instruments,187 giving investors the right to future shares in a company.  However, the company 
may never receive a future equity financing or elect to convert the securities upon such future 
financing.  In addition, the company may never undergo a liquidity event such as a sale of the 
company or an IPO.  If neither the conversion of the securities nor a liquidity event occurs, the 
Purchasers could be left holding the securities in perpetuity.  The securities have numerous 
transfer restrictions and will likely be highly illiquid, with no secondary market in which to sell 
                                               
       187  See Wroldsen, supra, note 7, at 555, 569–70, 573–76 (discussing the offering of revenue-sharing and 
SAFE instruments under Reg. CF). See also Heminway, supra note 10, at 7. 
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000
All Reg. CF Offerings
Initial  Coin Offerings
2016-2018 ICO's Compared to All Reg. CF digital 
tokens in Millions
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them.  The securities are not equity interests, have no ownership rights, have no rights to the 
company’s assets or profits, and have no voting rights or ability to direct the company or its 
actions.  If someone invests, he or she is betting that the company will be worth more than $7 
million in the future.  
    It should be noted that many offerings are still in progress. However, the data about 
demographics, geographical regional level of participation nationwide, the  principal office 
locations are digital token offerings are established at the filing date.  In Chart 7, the author 
provides data as to the date and maximum amount of the offering; the capital raised as of 
November 30, 2018, the name of the company and the digital token offered; and the company 
principal office location and the choice of entity location. 
 
FINDING B3: DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS GROWING MORE RAPIDLY IN 
2018. (SEE CHART 7). 
 
Chart 7 -  2018 Reg. CF digital tokens offerings188 
 
 
Amount of 
2018 
Offerings 
Capital 
Raised by 
November 
30, 2018 
Form Filings (C/A 
and C-W) 
Name of Company and 
Digital Token  
Date of 
Token 
Offering 
Entity Choice/ 
Principal 
Office 
Location 
      
$ 898,000 $171,287.00 Form C/A – 
Extended until 
2018.Oct2 
 
Indeco Financial Syndicate 
Inc’s 
Debt Until Securities Token 
Offering (DUSTO) 
2018. 
June28 
DE/Virginia 
$1,070,000 - Form C/A- Extended 
until 5/30/ 2019 
Reg. A Filed for $20 
Million 2018.Aug8 
Item Banc Inc.’s 
IBE Tokens (IBE) 
2018. 
June18 
SC/South 
Carolina 
$1,069,999 $94,166.40 Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.Sept5 
Dashing Corp., Inc’s 
Dashing Tokens 
2018. 
June6 
DE/Oregon 
$1,070,000 $10,388.00 Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.Dec31 
 
Test Foundation, Inc.’s 
Token Debt Payable by Assets 
2018. 
May31 
DE/California 
                                               
       188   This listing of information does not include debt offerings of companies that are not offering tokens in 
the original offer. E.g.  Blockstack Token, LLC offering $1.07 Million on March 1, 2018 to raise capital with a 
debt offering; a target of $200K at $1 price. Also, E.g. Unicoin Blockchain Inc., which is offering class B non-
voting common stock at $10 per share, with a minimum target offering of $10,000 and a maximum offering of 
$80,000. Additional information regarding the actual capital raised was retrieved from the Startengine website 
for Indeco, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) and Witnet. See Republic Crypto, 
https://republic.co/witnet (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).  
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$1,070,000 0* Withdrawn* 
Form C-W Filed 
Access Network Labs, Inc. 
Token Debt Payable by Assets 
 
2018. 
May 30 
DE/New York 
$1,070,000 $16,581.00 
 
Form C/A -Extended 
until 10/29/2018 
TrustaBit, LLC’s  
TAB Tokens 
 
2018. 
May 29 
DE/California 
$107,000 $22,290.00* Withdrawn* 
Form C-W Filed 
Time Token, Inc.’s Preferred 
Equity Time (PET) Tokens 
2018. 
May 23 
DE/Arizona 
$1,070,000 $118,200.00 Form C/A- Extended 
until 10/29/2018 
 
CEN, Inc.’s 
Basic Intelligence (BIT) 
Tokens 
2018. 
May 15 
DE/California 
$1,070,000 - Form C/A- Extended  EventJoin, Inc.’s  
SAB Tokens 
2018. 
May 11 
DE/California 
$1,070,000 $29,800.00 Form C/A-  
Extended until  
2019.Feb4 
 
JWL Com, Inc.  
JWL Coins 
2018. 
May4 
DE/California 
$1,070,000 $122,487.00 Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.Aug21 
 
Citizen Health Project, Inc.’s 
MEDEX or MDX Tokens 
2018. 
April24 
DE/Mississippi 
$1,070,000 10,866.00 n/a One Sphera Inc. 
CC Tokens 
 
2018. 
April20  
NV/Nevada 
$1,070,000 $157,234 Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.Dec31 
 
GeoPulse Exploration, Inc.’s 
CannCoin Tokens 
2018. 
April20 
NV/Nevada 
$107,000 - n/a Fullmeta Corp.’s  
META Tokens 
2018. 
April20 
DE/Utah 
$106,998 $11,342.52*  
 
Withdrawn* 
Form C-W Filed 
FrToken, Inc.’s  
CHIKN Tokens 
2018. 
April20 
DE/New 
Mexico 
$1,070,000   $80,141.00  
 
Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.Nov3 
Erndo, Inc.’s 
Violet Tokens 
2018. 
April20 
DE/Delaware 
$1,000,000 $15,550.00 Form C/A-  
Extended until  
2018.Sept18 
Supporter Inc.’s  
SP Tokens 
2018. 
April19 
GA/Georgia 
$1,070,000 $152,741.00 
 
Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.Sept10 
MintHealth, Inc.’s 
Mintheath Tokens 
2018. 
April19 
DE/California 
$107,000   $27,040.68  
 
Form C/A-  
Extended until  
2018.Sept14 
Crowdcoverage, Inc. 
COVR Tokens 
2018. 
April19 
DE/Nevada 
$1,070,000  $36,700.80  
 
Form C/A- Extended 
until 2018.July31 
Form D filed under 
506(c) for a $20 
Million Offering 
EpigenCare, Inc.’s 
EPIC Tokens 
2018. 
March20 
NY/New York 
$1,070,000 $1,069,983 Form D filed for a 
$13.9 Million 
Offering 
Witnet Foundation, Inc.’s 
WIT Tokens 
2018. 
March1 
DE/New Jersey 
$17,375,997 $2,113,166 
 
 TOTAL 2018  
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In 2018, 100% of the companies were tech related startup companies that sought to raise 
capital by offering digital tokens.  The type of technology startups varied by the target clients, 
goods or service markets.  For example, most of the companies identified as funding portals or 
technology businesses seeking to develop blockchain networks; six companies broadly 
identified as tech companies with health, consumer health registry or biotech applications; one 
company was developing a platform for cannabis sales; two developed web based marketing 
services; one a jewelry product,  tech insurance services; and another a tech security company. 
 By contrast, during 2017, companies offered digital tokens in only four offerings.  The 
types of companies varied, from medical records to sports—football, renewable energy and solar 
energy startups.  All four 2017 offerings included investment contracts and, in each case, a 
SAFT.  Additionally, each of the four digital token offerings is tied to the development of a 
blockchain distributed ledger. 
FINDING B4: DIGITAL TOKENS REPRESENTED FOUR OFFERINGS IN 2017 
(SEE CHART 8). 
 
Chart 8:  Reg. CF digital tokens in the 2017 offerings 
Amount of 
2017 
Offerings 
Amount of 
Capital 
Raised 2017 
Name of Digital Tokens Date of 
Token 
Offering 
Name, Entity 
Location/ 
Princ. Office 
$1,070,000 $466,896 Simple Agreement for a Future Token (SAFT) 
 
Mission: To use blockchain technology to 
establish a better, more secure and transparent 
framework for Electronic Medical Record that 
vastly improves the quality of care for patients 
and helps reduce healthcare providers’ costs. 
 
2017. 
Dec29 
MedChain, 
Inc. 
$1,070,000 $1,068,600 Simple Agreement for a Future Token (SAFT) 
Fanchise Tokens 
 
Mission: Built on the Blockchain and designed to 
combine the passion of live sport, the 
competition of fantasy sports, the engagement of 
video games, and the global reach of esports, the 
2017. 
Dec11 
Fanchise 
League 
Company, 
LLC 
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FCFL is the first pro sports league truly created 
for the digital age. 
 
$1,070,000 $106,450 Simple Agreement for a Future Token (SAFT) 
 
Mission:…a real-world company building 
revenue generating renewable energy assets that 
is also developing an Ethereum-based 
blockchain currency platform.  With the ability 
to implement smart contracts on a distributed 
ledger, the Sun Fund token will bring liquidity 
and a store of value for renewable energy assets 
while also helping to disintermediate global 
financial and energy markets. 
 
2017. 
Nov17 
Sun Fund 
Renewables, 
Inc. 
$744,000 $172,287 
 
Filed a 
Form C/A 
to extend 
the 
deadline to 
2018.Jan18 
Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT) 
Indecoin Tokens 
 
Mission: To be a stable crypto asset for stored 
value, an investment vehicle and an engine 
for the expansion of the clean economy, 
including solar energy, battery storage and smart 
controls and sensors for energy efficiency. Our 
network will support four independent roles with 
distinct, interoperable smart contracts.   
 
2017. 
Nov9 
Indeco, LLC 
 
$3,954,000 
 
$1,813,233 
 
Totals 
 
  
 
b. Growth Compared to Other Capital Formation 
FINDING B5: COMPARISON OF DIGITAL TOKENS FROM 2017 TO 2018 (SEE 
CHART 9). 
Chart 9: Reg. CF Digital Tokens under Reg. CF 2017 - 2018 
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The locations of the principal offices of companies offering securities under Reg. CF.  
The principal locations are western states, such as  California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah and Oregon.  The next grouping is locations in Delaware, New York, 
Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina and Mississippi.  This research project does not 
address the reasons why there is not participation in digital tokens by companies in states 
outside of coastal areas. 
 
FINDING B6: PRINCIPAL OFFICE LOCATIONS ARE PRIMARILY LOCATED IN 
CALIFORNIA; THEN DELAWARE, NEVADA AND NEW YORK (SEE CHART 10). 
Chart 10 – Principal Office Location of Reg. CF Digital Token Offerings 
 
 
FINDING B7: GROWTH PROGRESSION OF DIGITAL TOKENS IS 
ACCELERATING IN LATE 2017 THROUGHOUT 2018. (SEE CHART 11). 
Chart 11  – Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth Progression of Reg. CF digital tokens 
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2. Funding Portal Intermediation Findings 
FINDING C1: REGISTERED FUNDING PORTALS EXPANDED ACROSS THE 
COUNTRY 
            
One of the requirements of Reg. CF is that companies use a funding portal to host the 
offering. The role of the funding portal is best described in Werbach’s description of an 
intermediary:189 
“What makes activity happen in this arrangement is the intermediaries’  
ability to aggregate activity on both sides.  Financial services relationships  
are a good example of intermediary trust.  Commercial banks sit in the middle 
of the transaction flow between depositors and borrowers…..Investment  
banks structure and intermediate financial transactions in capital markets….” 
 
As of July 11, 2018, there were forty-three funding portals registered to serve in the role as 
funding portals for the companies offering securities under Reg. CF.  These entities served the 
crowdfunding market by providing structure for the transactions over the past three years.   
The chart below provides a listing of the top five funding portals completing a majority 
of all of the investment crowdfunding transactions for this period. There are two notable 
inferences from this data.  First, StartEngine Capital, LLC is doing a lion share of the investment 
crowdfunding offerings, which suggests that this particular funding portal has an effective 
system for raising of capital.  Second, the number of overall funding portals is increasing, but 
fewer funding portals are conducting more offerings. 
 
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS CONSOLIDATED OFFERINGS AND MORE 
FUNDING PORTALS REGISTERED (SEE CHART 12). 
                               Chart 12 – 2018 Jan - June Funding Portals By # of Offerings 
 
 
                                               
       189    Werbach, supra note 15, at 28. 
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StartEngine Capital LLC
WeFunder Portal LLC
SI Securities LLC
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Open Deal LLC aka "Republic"
18 other Dealmakers
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During the prior six-month period of January–June 2017, StartEngine Capital LLC, 
WeFunder, and SI Securities LLC were the three leading funding portals for investment 
crowdfunding offerings.  Next, First Democracy VC and OpenDeal, LLC also performed a 
number of transactions.  From January—June 2017, the same five funding portals hosted 
offerings. 
The principal funding portals that assist companies with digital token offerings are Start 
Engine Capital, LLC, Open Deal, Inc. d/b/a Republic, First Democracy VC, and truCrowd, Inc.  
The chart below illustrates just how many more offerings StartEngine Capital, LLC is 
conducting compared to other funding portals in the digital token space.  Also, the chart 
illustrates where most of the digital token offerings are hosted and the pace at which they are 
growing from 2017 to 2018.  The funding portal, StartEngine Capital, LLC is substantially 
greater than any other funding portal, which calls into question the scope and growth of Reg. 
CF digital tokens in investment crowdfunding. 
 
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS ACCELERATING BUT CONCENTRATION IN 
FOUR FUNDING PORTALS IN 2018. (SEE CHART 13). 
 
Chart 13 – 2017 - 2018 Funding Portals By # of Offerings for Reg. CF digital tokens 
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2. Terms and Conditions of Offerings 
As might be expected in different industries, the descriptions of the SAFTs or other digital 
token investments can vary significantly.  For example, in the Fanchise Sports League, Inc. 
digital token offering, the company provides its investors the right to vote on games and 
provides an opportunity to participate in a $1,000,000 purse on football team winnings, based 
on the number of digital tokens that the investor owns.190  This right to vote on games is unique 
to this particular transaction as it engages the investor in the company’s games and allows them 
to potentially win, when their team wins.  Another company, MedChain would allow its 
MedChain utility tokens to “used within the network to purchase entry credits facilitating 
Electronic Medical Record storage and access control.”191  
The right to actually receive a digital token or some other means of non-security utility 
Tokens varies by Offering.  Most of the 2018 companies discuss the right to receive a future 
utility token, contingent upon the company’s creation of a network based upon blockchain and 
distributed ledger technology.192  Or other language, such as, “the right to receive future utility 
tokens when and if the company creates a network based upon blockchain and distributed ledger 
technology.”193  In some offerings, the investors are allowed to choose whether they receive 
back cash or a “possible” digital token.  Some companies state that only they will decide 
whether the investor receives digital tokens, common stock or other cash payment. 
Voting rights vary across transactions.  In most transactions, the investor does not have 
voting rights in company decisions.  However, there are various decisions on which an investor 
could vote, such as what new promotional events the company could have.  For example, 
Fanchise League states when it discusses the FAN Token Ecosystem, “[t]he Fan Access 
                                               
       190  See Fan Token Blog, http://blog.fantoken.network/frequenty/ (Dec. 28, 2017). Fanchise Sports League, 
Inc. also hosted a crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo which surpassed their $5 million ask by December 23, 
2017. See www.fcfl.io (last visited on August 12, 2018) (“Ten-day campaign was the first token sale ever hosted 
by crowdfunding leader Indiegogo (in conjunction with MicroVentures) and garnered attention from the likes of 
the New York Times, Forbes, and CoinDesk.”). These offerings were to be followed up with a public digital token 
sale for fans looking to gain early access to voting power in March or early April of 2018. See Fan Token Blog, 
http://blog.fantoken.network/frequenty/ (Dec. 28, 2017).  
      191 See MedChain, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last visited on Aug. 15, 2018) (describing their 
SAFT offering). 
      192    Id.  
      193    Id. 
 
                  Patricia H. Lee (forthcoming St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 92:4, March 2019)  [10-Dec-2018 11:50am 
   
 | P a g e  
 
53 
Network and FAN Tokens are going to revolutionize the experience of being a sports fan, and 
the FCFL will be the first league built on and powered by the Fan Access Network.”194   
 
FINDING C3: TERMS OF DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS HAVE VARIOUS 
TERMS (SEE CHART 14). 
 
Chart 14  – Terms and Conditions of Digital Token Offerings 
RIGHTS TO TOKENS Right to receive future utility tokens based on an uncertain future 
event (e.g. blockchain and distributed ledger technology) 
 
CONTINGENCY Based upon the successful development of Tokens, the company 
creates a network based on the blockchain upon which the Tokens 
function. 
TIMING Uncertain 
EVENT Optional, not guaranteed 
VOTING RIGHTS Tied to decisions of the company or decisions related to other 
promotions and events of the company; 
 
Right to Vote on Games 
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS The right to participate in purses and team winnings, based on 
number of Tokens investor owns 
DECISION FOR THE 
CONTINGENT EVENT 
 
The company 
TOKEN AVAILABILITY 
 
On wallets on open source and/or future tradeable exchanges 
TIED TO OTHER 
SECURITIES 
Common or Debt plus Tokens 
REPAYMENT In Tokens, Cash, Common Stock 
REPAYMENT OPTION 
DECISION TO RECEIVE 
CASH OR TOKENS 
 
Investor or the company 
 
                                               
      194    The Fan Token Ecosystem, FAN TOKEN BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), http://blog.fantoken.network/fan-token-
ecosystem/. 
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PART III: CONCERNS WITH DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS 
 
A. What is Troubling About Digital Token Offerings? 
         The data of investment crowdfunding company offerings include a range of common 
stock, to convertible debt, tokens and coins offered to investors.  It demonstrates that investment 
crowdfunding offerings have led to mixed results, some troubling developments.  On the 
positive side, this research supports the assertion that investment crowdfunding has had 
momentum, even though still in its infancy.  There is greater breadth in publicly offered 
crowdfunding campaigns.  Those campaigns can be measured by the increasing numbers of 
company principal office locations throughout the country; increasing amounts and types of 
securities offerings; and an increasing variety of companies that are participating.  These 
amounts represent a sizable expansion in investment crowdfunding under Reg. CF.  The next 
section discusses the troubling concerns with digital Token offerings, which include 
Uncertainty and Risk with digital tokens, cancelled offerings and goals of Reg. CF yet to be 
attained.  
1. Uncertainty and Risk  
         The more troubling discovery in the research is the accelerating movement of companies 
offering Reg. CF blockchain based tokens to investors.  These investment contracts that include 
a possible conversion to a token or coin that is distributable upon the success of blockchain 
ledger technology.  The greatest concern is the uncertainty of blockchain technology.  To the 
extent that companies are raising funds based on that success, the likelihood of raising the 
necessary funds becomes more speculative.  Investment contracts with token conversions are 
written such that risk is a given and that there is no guarantee the services or tokens will ever 
come to fruition. 
The Form C/A’s, C-U’s and C-W’s provide a picture of companies that may be having 
difficulty raising capital on the funding portal.  C-U allows a company to extend the time that 
it can seek funding. 195 The first of the negative results relates to companies that are not able to 
raise the funding that they seek. 
                                               
       195    Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last updated Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#1 
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When raising capital, businesses must fulfill their business needs as well as stay apprised 
of changing regulations in order to protect their investors  and reduce legal liability.  To the 
extent that businesses successfully raise capital, but fail to appreciate shareholder interests or 
potential liability, business losses and securities and fiduciary liability can become real 
concerns.  A good example of this balancing is the case of Indeco Financial Syndicate, Inc. 
which touts itself as one of the first companies to file a registration for Tokens under Reg. CF.196  
On the same day as the Indeco Reg. CF filing, the SEC froze the assets of another company, 
based in Quebec, that had raised $15 million but failed to register their token offerings.197 
An example of a more successful fundraising campaign is Witnet Foundation, a 
Delaware company with a principal office in the state of Washington. Witnet raised $1,069,983 
from 688 investors by March of 2018.198  One difference in this company’s offering from typical 
Reg. CF and other securities offering is that instead of the company repaying its debt obligation 
with cash, the company plans to repay the obligation with Wit tokens and 20% interest.199   
As Witnet and Indeco suggest, companies face a variety of dilemmas in raising capital.  
On the one hand, a company seeks to maintain a sustainable business venture.  To do that 
requires a basic accountability to their business plan while not being blind to new innovation.  
Innovation is believed to be the main driver of long-term economic growth in the United 
States.200  But innovation includes uncertainty, which in turn presents the dilemma for a 
company in asserting what possibly could go wrong.  Towards that end, a best practice would 
be to think of what could go wrong and plan to minimize potential liabilities.  However, 
minimizing liabilities may require not always giving the most valued investors exactly what 
they may demand.  Thus, the dilemma hinges on how to harness investor satisfaction in an ever 
                                               
       196   David Levine, Press Coverage of Our Efforts To Bring SEC-Compliant Crypto Into the Mainstream, 
STARTENGINE.COM (Jan. 2018)  https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (Indeco CEO 
David Levine is interviewed by Peter Armstrong on the CBC show “On the Money.”); see also Press Release, 
Indeco, Indeco Launches First Token Pre-sale under SEC’s Regulation Crowdfunding Rules (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-regulation-crowdfunding-rules-
e82dad79345  (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
       197  See THE 21 REPORT, supra note 112, at 16; Levine, supra note 191. 
       198    REPUBLIC.CO, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited August 15, 2018). 
       199  REPUBLIC.CO, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited October 29, 2018). 
       200    Brian Krumm, Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Shark Tank Shouldn’t Be the Model, 70 ARK. 
L. REV. 553, 555 (2017). 
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technologically advancing society.  Lastly, a company must always do necessary compliance 
to avoid state or federal regulatory discipline. 
In Reg. CF capital formation, the ecosystem includes the companies, the funding portals 
mandated by the SEC to be used in these offerings, the employees, and the crowd.  Companies 
raising capital via Reg. CF, are required to be assisted by funding portals in their first steps 
towards “going public.”  The SEC requires that funding portals follow a variety of rules or be 
subject to Section 5(c) of the Securities Act and sections of the Securities Exchange Act.201  
Funding portals have additional legal exposure and must make sure to comply with their own 
registration requirements.202  To date, companies with token offerings have been assisted by 
only four funding portals, while overall, there were forty-three funding portals registered. Also, 
companies that use Reg. CF have employees.  As one of the normative goals of investment 
crowdfunding during the past two years, companies have disclosed over 5,300 employees, 
generally.  The number is smaller for token offerings, with 149 employees.  The investors are 
also essential to this ecosystem.  Their particular interest in purchasing coin-based 
securities/currencies may also be driving the demand for these products. 
The good news is that the current financial movement drives an ecosystem for businesses 
to raise funds, hire employees, and include new shareholders into the fold of their business.  
The downside is that the token frenzy may wane, leaving investors with shiny coins to satisfy 
the obligations and the companies with potential future disputes.  One solution to enhanced risk 
and potential investor dissatisfaction is to provide robust and clear offering disclosures.  
Although difficult to do when funding is needed, companies must recognize that due diligence 
requires a long-term view, which includes paying close attention to funding that has a low 
probability of repayment.  Further, state and federal securities agencies can be helpful by 
providing clarity on the allowance or disallowance of certain types of securities.  Tokens are 
                                               
      201  See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Steven J. Muehler, et al., No. 2:18-cv-01677-CAS(SKx) 
(April 4, 2018) (granting the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the defendant in a case “assert[ing] 
claims against defendants for (1) violations of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) . . . for 
(2) violations of Sections 10(b), 15(a), and 20(e) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), . . . 78t . . . and 
for (3) violations of Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5”). 
       202     The SEC must demonstrate a prima facie case that defendants have violated Section 5(c) of the Securities 
Act. Section 5(c) of the Securities act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to make use of any means or 
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to 
buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has 
been filed . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(c) (2012). 
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just the latest development in a type of security or reward offered.  We can only imagine the 
outer limits of virtual securities to come. 
         One difference in Reg. CF digital tokens is that there are notice filings with the SEC.  
Because of that fact, token-funded companies are likely to be more cautious than companies 
that either are not registering because they do not think they are offering a security or because 
they are trying to circumvent the law.  This difference may play out with fewer matters 
involving fraud, manipulation and deception charges as can be found with unregistered ICOs.   
However, what is more troubling is the complexity of the offerings and the open question 
of whether these investors have a basic understanding of what they are buying.  This part of the 
story will continue to unfold as companies provide disclosures to their buyers as time goes on. 
With respect to companies, the warning signs are present.  There is volatility in current 
blockchain-based transactions that are currently trading.  If the company succeeds, then they 
not only have successfully raised capital but also will have potentially happy investors.  To the 
extent that the company does not meet its mission of successfully creating a token utility, 
commodity, or security, and the token fails to meet the goals of the offering, then those 
companies would be best served by thinking about the alternative plan to the failure of the 
offering, which makes Professor Heminway’s assertion so relevant here.203  As we are in an age 
of alternative entities, alternative finance, and alternative facts, it behooves companies, their 
advisors, investors, and the agencies that have oversight over these transactions, to think long 
and hard about the responsibility we each have to other and to ourselves.  
Should we should be troubled by the development that Reg. CF is being used for pre-
coin token offerings as a leverage to other coin offerings?204  Rather than fail to register, 
companies are engaging in digital token transactions that are exempt from registration in light 
of the regulatory uncertainty.  This part is understandable as a company would want to avoid 
                                               
       203   Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professional Responsibility in an Age of Alternative Entities, Alternative 
Finance, and Alternative Facts, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 227, 256, 259 (2017). 
       204 See, THE 21 REPORT, supra note 112, after the SEC recently investigated The DAO organization, which 
sold DAO tokens to fund investments. The founders described it as a "crowdfunding contract" to raise funds to 
create a company in crypto space. Id. The press release notes that although crowdfunding was used to describe the 
design, it would not qualify for an exception under Regulation Crowdfunding because the platform or organization 
was not registered as “a broker-dealer or a funding portal.” Id. 
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securities liability and unintended consequences.205  But the Reg. CF offering may be just a 
means to another larger digital token offering end. Arguably, that leverage is a good thing. 
The greater inclusion of pre-token/coin conversions raises long-term sustainability 
concerns for companies and long-term viability concerns for investors.  The existence of digital 
token offerings under Reg. CF, albeit [a small number and] relatively insubstantial in dollar 
value as compared to the total number of Reg. CF offerings and the total number of ICOs, raises 
many questions for companies and investors.  What are the considerations for companies in 
choosing Reg. CF digital tokens and how should investors respond?  To the extent that 
companies are relying on the 4(a)(6) exemption from registration, should these types of coin 
offerings and sweeteners be registered as initial coin offerings?  What limits should the SEC 
set now to protect the crowd from bearing the brunt of the risk of valueless cryptocurrency 
repayments or convertible instruments that may never convert to equity or anything of value?  
Will the SEC abdicate authority to the extent that companies disclose that risk of loss to the 
investing crowd is great or will they intervene to set parameters on this new blockchain based 
token movement?  It is predictable that if businesses fail, investors will feel taken advantage of, 
thus creating heightened legal risk for companies.206   
 
2. Inadequate Disclosures 
 
         Another negative indicator in the Reg. CF crowdfunding data is that the disclosures may  
                                               
      205   There are very few cases/matters relating to investment crowdfunding company violations or controversies.  
However, in The Matter of: Allen Hydro Electric Corporation related to the offering of debt securities through “an 
online equity crowdfunding website.” Allen Hydro Energy Corp., Ohio Dep’t. Comm., Order No. 17-028, at *1 
(Sept. 18, 2017).  The Ohio Dept. of Comm. found that the Corporation had several violations of the Reg. CF. Id. 
at *1–*4. The violations in the Consent Agreement included: a failure to follow the disclosure requirements; Allen 
Hydro Electric’s “[b]usiness [p]lan did not have a reasonable basis in fact”; and they failed to follow proper 
procedures. Id. at *2. In light of these violations, the Respondent’s crowdfunding attempt did not qualify for the 
crowdfunding exemption. See id. at *3. Additionally, the SEC issued several Comment Letters to Worthpoint 
Corporation and Sagoon, Inc. See generally Letter from Jeanne Campanelli, Partner, KHLK LLP, to Barbara C. 
Jacobs, Assistant Director, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 23, 2016) (SEC digital archives). The SEC 
noticed there was an offer to exchange common stock purchased under Reg. CF for other shares. See id. Both 
companies stated that it was to "grant those shareholders the greater informational rights and ability to freely resell 
their shares that Regulation A provides, and place all the company's shareholders on an equal footing." Id. 
       206  Two questions, not addressed in this article, relate to the uncertainty of blockchain’s success as most of 
the ICO or Reg. CF is tied to the Blockchain.  Further, the strength or flaws of the company’s business model are 
also important.   
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comply with the requirements of the Securities laws, but still fail the investors.207  The reasons 
may have to do with the inability to portray through disclosure the level of risk that is involved 
in investing in the particular company.208  This is even truer in the case of blockchain based 
token offerings under Reg. CF.209  Most governmental agencies have a difficult time explaining 
what the risks are for the purchase of a blockchain based token, let alone a startup company 
working with a group of advisors, funding portals, and employees new to this new 
technology.210  Most unsophisticated investors would not likely have the background to 
understand the terms of these offerings.211  Even though the disclosures may appear adequate, 
it seems unlikely that investors would understand whether it is likely or unlikely that he/she 
will ever receive a digital token and whether the company is able to implement its version of 
smart contracts on the blockchain.212  This leads to the third negative indicator and that relates 
to where those disclosures, or lack thereof, leave unsophisticated investors. 
 
3. Investors in Limbo 
 
         Before the recent crash of coins, it may have been difficult for investors to think clearly 
when there were so many varying reports that coin purchasers were profiting in large 
amounts.213  It sounds good, but understanding the distinctions between companies, services, 
offerings, timetables, terms and conditions, can have an adverse effect on investors.  The worst 
case is that an investor spends hard earned cash on a company’s capital campaign and loses his 
or her money.  The likely case is that the investor will be left in limbo wondering whether the 
company’s goods or services will ever allow for a token to be issued and exchanged on some 
future distributed ledger.214 
                                               
       207   See Hinman, supra note 3. 
       208    See id. 
       209    See id. 
      210   See Jack Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and 
Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 604 (2013). 
       211    See id. at 605. 
       212    See id. 
       213    Rohr & Wright, supra note 19, at 81. 
       214    Id., at 82–83. 
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 An illustration of investors in limbo, is to observe the frequent postings by investors 
who purchased Indeco Dusto digital tokens.  Several months after Indeco exceeded its minimum 
capital request, raising over $171,000, investors began to ask about the progress of the 
development of the digital tokens and the blockchain.  Below are the string of posts (as included 
on the StartEngine website) between a frustrated investor and the company on the StartEngine 
funding portal website on November 30, 2018:215 
 
“…Potential Investor 4 months ago  
Still no peep. The writing seems to be on the wall and yet I saw Indeco  
continues to sell the theoretical tokens at a discount on other forums.  
I should have known better.” 
 
Around a month later, a company representative responds: 
 
“…Indeco - Issuer 3 months ago  
Hi Richard -- we've been focusing on building out the platform and  
qualifying for our Security Token Offering with the SEC. It's a brutal process.  
 
Now that we're solidly in business, with revenue and technology (no longer  
a theoretical company), I'll be in closer touch.  
 
You should have my personal email address as I've sent notes to all investors  
in the past. Feel free to contact me directly. Happy to give investors my cell # as well. 
 
When we pull off the STO, you'll be glad you invested. :) David” 
 
A couple of months later, the Investors inquires again. 
 
“…Potential Investor 17 days ago  
…Have not have much communication other than the post below related to the status 
of the SAFT investment. The March 2019 deadline is coming up where are SAFTs 
could potentially become worthless. Is the company on track to issue tokens soon or 
before the deadline? The lack of communication and updates makes it seem as if the 
company is waiting until the expiration date so that the SAFTs expire worthless. I 
have reached out many times on the Indeco website and through this platform asking 
for updates and have never received a response to my e-mails which does not give me 
confidence in the project being successful. I think many SAFT investors would like 
some communication on the status of this investment with the expiration date coming 
up. Also if the expiration date in March is reached does the company plan on 
extending the deadline per the provision in the SAFT agreement or will the company 
let the SAFTs expire?” 
 
“…Potential Investor 7 days ago  
                                               
       215    Startengine website, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (Last retrieved on November 30, 2018) 
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Is anyone from the company ever going to reply back and give us s recent update? I 
have reached out through the portal and the company web[s]ite numerous times. 
Starting to think are money is gone... shouldn’t be that hard to get s response from 
someone.” 	
There was no posted company’s response as of November 30, 2018. 
 
4. Cancelled Offerings 
 
Another troubling concern is that not all companies have  successfully raised funds 
through these digital token offerings, as some of the offerings have been cancelled.  Some 
companies fail to raise the capital needed for their emerging enterprises.  However, to the extent 
there is uncertainty about the outcome of digital token transactions and higher risk in 
transactions based on blockchain technologies, that lack of participation could be a good thing 
for the potential investors and possibly the companies. On the other hand, if companies can 
raise capital and grow successful businesses, providing needed services and goods to the 
communities, then the failure to participate in Reg. CF investment crowdfunding will impact 
the potential economic growth for years to come. 
         Three companies withdraw from their Reg. CF digital token offerings during the time 
period.  One example is Access Network Labs, Inc., a Delaware-incorporated company located 
in New York, launched a token debt asset offering.216  Access Network had a noble goal of 
“[c]reating access to financial and technological tools for the word’s [sic] 1.7 billion unbanked 
adults through the development of a sustainable decentralized bank.”217  The minimum funding 
goal was $100,000, with a minimum investment of $50 in return for an Access Token.218  Their 
maximum funding goal was to raise $1.07 million.219  Access Network Labs had a breakdown 
for the token sale: 30% of the tokens were dedicated to growing the branchless banking 
infrastructure and user base; 30% of the tokens were to be dedicated to rewarding the 
development of applications; and the remaining were tokens towards the sale (21%), founding 
                                               
        216    Access Network Labs, Inc., Offering Memo (Form C) (May 30, 2018), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739626/000173962618000001/formc.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) 
(offering Token DPA, Series S-a DPAs (Debt Payable by Assets), 100,000 units at a $1.00 price). 
       217     Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
       218     Id. 
       219     See id. 
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team (12%), community rewards (3%), and advisors (4%).220  However, after initially amending 
the offering, the company withdrew the offering on July 27, 2018.221 
 Two other companies withdrew their digital token offerings during this period.  Time 
Token, Inc. had a principal office in Arizona and was incorporated in Delaware.222 On May 23, 
2018, Time Token sought to raise $107,000 for its goal of merging blockchain technology with 
vacation rental real estate, to bring liquidity to the vacation rental market.  Their digital token 
was called Preferred Equity (PET) Tokens.  However, by September 9, 2018, Time Token 
withdrew its offer to sell PET tokens to the general public after raising over $22,000.223 A third 
example was FrToken, Inc., a company based in New Mexico and incorporated in Nevada.  
FrToken offered a CHIKN Token on April 20, 2018 with the goal of creating a decentralized 
blockchain-based platform that allows companies to pay audiences directly for watching ads 
and answering surveys.224 The CHIKN token represented a single share of Series B Common 
Stock of this company. After raising over $11,000 of the $107,000 maximum funding sought, 
they too filed a Form C-W and withdrew the offering on October 1, 2018.225   
It is also possible that these companies underestimated the costs or potential liabilities.  In the 
case of FrToken, they raised over the minimum ask of $9000, which in this regulatory 
environment, may not have been enough to remain sustainable. 
It would take additional research to determine the reasons why these companies were 
not successful in their crowdfunding campaigns.  The top four reasons that a company fails are 
that there was no market need for their goods or services; they simply ran out of money; 226  
they didn’t have the right team formed; and they lacked the proper competitive advantages to 
                                               
       220     See id. 
       221  EDGAR Search Results, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/cgi-
bin/browse-edgar?CIK=1739626&owner=exclude&action=getcompany (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); see also, 
Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (showing caption of 
“Cancelled! Access Network has withdrawn their campaign.”). The reason for the withdrawal is not listed on the 
website. Id. A withdrawal could also indicate a retooling or finding capital through another exempt or non-exempt 
offering. 
       222    Time Token, Inc. Offering memorandum (Form C) filed May 23, 2018 available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739501/000166516018000482/0001665160-18-000482-index.htm 
       223    Time Token Form C-W filed September 7, 2018 available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739501/000166516018000905/0001665160-18-000905-index.htm 
       224     FrToken, Inc. Form C filed April 20, 2018 available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1736160/000166516018000313/0001665160-18-000313-index.htm 
       225     FrToken, Inc. Form C-W filed October 1, 2018 available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1736160/000166516018000313/0001665160-18-000313-index.htm 
       226    See id. 
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continue with the business.227  Timing of offerings is also important and to the extent that the 
offering does not go well, that may present problems for the company. However, it is also 
possible that a withdrawal could indicate a retooling or landing alternative capital from a more 
private source.  
 
5. Crowdfund Act Goals Yet To Be Attained 
 
         In light of the research findings, it is highly questionable whether the normative 
goals of the Crowdfund Act have been fulfilled.  There is still much work to be done on the two 
goals of encouraging small business growth and furthering employment, specifically to 
“help entrepreneurs raise the capital they need to put Americans back to work and create an 
economy that’s built to last.”228  There are two reasons for this concern.  First, considering 
investment crowdfunding’s potential as a decentralizing, democratizing tool,229 With more 
encouragement and decreased costs, we may see more activity.  Second the fact that more rapid 
growth is occurring in blockchain based tokens is disconcerting, as this shares similarities with 
the proliferation of unsound mortgages in the 2008 mortgage debacle.  One must hope that this 
trend will turn out differently.  Let us hope that it will.  To the extent that the blockchain does 
not become a reality, jobs will be at stake.  Also, there are geographical considerations that have 
impacts on the future success of capital formation.  Some areas of the country are not 
participating in either investment crowdfunding generally, or in the more specialized digital 
token offerings.   
 
6. Alternative Financing 
 
          For companies, theoretically, there are a variety of financings that would be available 
                                               
       227 Triin Linagmi, The Most Common Reasons Startups Fail, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3044519/7-of-the-most-common-reasons-startups-fail noting (Some companies 
run out of cash before they are able to raise the funds.) 
       228    Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama To Sign Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-
our-business-startups-jobs-act 
       229    Rohr & Wright, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
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for amounts under $ 1,000,000.230 Some of the most common alternative financing measures 
for financing up to $ 1 million include friend and family financing, bank and government loan 
financing, factoring and peer to peer lending.  
 
Friends and Family Financing – This is defined as funding from members of the 
business owners’ family and friends who provide loans for debt or cash for equity in the 
company. Family and friend’s contributions are additional to cash and other contributions 
provided by the owners, themselves (commonly called bootstrapping).  This early stage 
financing is not discussed in this article, since it is typically provided at the early stages of 
the business and not in this growth cycle of the business. 
 
          Bank and Government Loans – One traditional way for a business to get capital is to 
obtain a loan from their bank, community development organization small business 
investment company or other lender.231 The business can also seek a guarantee of their loan 
from the Small Business Administration. 
        
          Factoring is the outright purchase of a business’ outstanding accounts receivable by a 
commercial finance company at a “factor” which is typically between 70 percent and 90 
percent of the receivable at the time the company purchases it.232 
 
          Peer to Peer Lending – In peer-to-peer networks, “the borrower gets a cheaper loan than 
the banks and credit card companies offer. The lender gets more interest than offered in the 
bank or the bond market. The lenders…take the risk that they may never see their money 
again…websites such as Prosper and Lending Club…function like a bank loan officer, taking 
loan applications, checking credit scores, employment and debt levels. They say they reject 90 
percent of applicants. Lending Club, for instance, requires a minimum FICO score of 660. The 
national average credit score is about 690.233 
 
For companies with excellent credit ratings, access to accredited and sophisticated 
investors, angel networks, other alternatives may be available, such as angel investments, 
venture capital financing, private placements and initial public offerings (IPO’s).  It is unlikely 
                                               
      230     Sources include Indiana Venture Center, Successful Angel Investing (January 2015) and Donald F. 
Kuratko, Entrepreneurship Theory, Process, Practice, Part II, Chapter 8, Sources of Capital for 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, p. 232. 
       231     Jerome Katz and Richard P. Green, III, ENTREPRENEURIAL SMALL BUSINESS, Chapter 15, 
Small Business Finance: Using Equity, Debt, and Gifts (McGraw-Hill Irwin, NY 2014) at pp. 500-501. 
       232     Allbusiness.com, See http://www.allbusiness.com/the-difference-between-factoring-and-
accounts-receivable-financing-14847411- 1.html, retrieved on March 9, 2016. 
       233    Jim Gallagher, Is Lending to Strangers Smart Investing?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Jan. 27, 2013). 
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that the companies availing themselves of financing under Reg. CF, have these tools available 
to them. 
 
B. Positive Findings  
 
1. Some Companies Attained Goals 
 
A positive outcome about investment crowdfunding was that a number of successful 
offerings occurred during this time period.  On April 6, 2018, Wellbeing Brewing Company, 
LLC, a St. Louis based company organized in Missouri, conducted a Reg. CF crowdfunding 
offering.234  The company sought to raise a minimum of $125,000 up to a maximum of 
$200,000 and provide investors convertible notes paying 6% interest, which would be 
payable by April 6, 2023.235  The company’s goal is to create a healthy craft beer for 
customers who do not drink alcohol.  This novel customer product was well received by 
investors, which allowed Wellbeing to raise $199,000 from 70 investors and successfully 
close their offering within three months’ time.  Wellbeing conducted its offering via 
NVSTED,236 a St. Louis Regional Economic Development Partnership-developed a funding 
portal through its website Nvstedwithus.com.237 
MedChain, Inc., a Delaware incorporated company located in Colorado, quickly 
became oversubscribed for its offering of a minimum of $10,000 of common stock with a 
SAFT to a maximum of $1.07 million.238  The company seeks to develop a “community-
                                               
       234    Wellbeing Brewing Company, LLC Form C, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1731872/000173187218000002/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
      235    Wellbeing Brewing Company LLC, Form C, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1731872/000173187218000002/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018); 
See also, WELLBEING BREWING COMPANY, https://wellbeingbrewing.com/ (last visited October 3, 2018). 
     236     Brian Feldt and Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership Launches Nvsted, a New 
Crowdfunding Platform, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-
louis-economic-development-partnership-launches-nvsted-a-new-crowdfunding/article_e539c20c-04c8-5475-
85a9-cfc87e25bd13.html. 
      237     Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership launching crowdfunding platform, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-economic-development-
partnership-launching-crowdfunding-platform/article_50f3a1bf-7564-5e38-b2c6-f8b54b130193.html. 
      238    MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last visited Sept. 14, 2018); See also 
MedChain, Form C, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1726640/000166516018000130/xslC_X01/primary_doc.xml (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
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driven solution” to the growing field of electronic medical records and electronic protected 
health information.239  Although the company did not raise the maximum amount sought, 
after raising $466,896, MedChain closed the offering to additional investors.240   
           Another example of a successful offering is Farm From a Box, Inc.241  Farm from a 
Box, Inc. is a California benefit corporation, incorporated on February 6, 2012 with principal 
offices located in San Francisco, California.242  This company has developed an innovative 
modularly designed farm system that provides tools and technology needed to support a 2-acre 
off-grid farm.  The company manufactures and sells its farm system to consumers and large-
scale buyers with the hope of connecting communities to healthy, sustainably grown food and 
revolutionizing local food production.243  They initially set SAFEs244 funding goals of a 
minimum amount of $25,000 and maximum amount of $535,000.245  However, they amended 
their offering amounts to $100,000 with a greater maximum of $999,999 in a later Form C/A 
filing.246  Although not their maximum target goal, the company ultimately raised $148,999 
from 240 investors and concluded their first campaign in March 2018.247  As this company is a 
startup with a bold idea, they will continue to need capital, which suggests there is still risk for 
their initial investors.248  
 For companies that sought to form capital with digital tokens, there were two of note 
that leveraged the Reg. CF offering and continued to raise greater levels of capital.  One 
company, Item Banc, Inc, is a company located and organized in South Carolina that is a tech 
                                               
       239    MedChain, StartEngine, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
       240    Id. 
       241    Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Sept. 16, 2018). 
       242    Farm from a Box, Form C/A, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/FFABformC.pdf; see also FARM 
FROM A BOX, www.farmfromabox.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).  
       243   Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). See also 
Form C-AR filed May 1, 2018, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/FFABformC.pdf. 
       244   The SAFEs were called Crowd Safe, an investment contract between investors and companies, wherein 
the investment is “in exchange for the chance to earn a return—in the form of equity in the company—if it’s 
acquired or has an IPO.” How the Crowd Safe works, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/learn/investors/crowdsafe (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2018). The Crowd Safe was developed by the Platform Republic. Id. 
       245   Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
       246    Farm from a Box, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (Jul. 21, 2016) (identifying an 
offering deadline of December 16, 2016). 
       247    Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
       248    See Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 551–53 (discussing potential and risks of SAFE investments). 
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Company supporting Basic Human need products in five categories: Food, Building Materials, 
Basic Clothing, Paper Products, and Hygiene.  On June 18, 2018 Item Banc, offered $1.07 
million under Reg. CF of IBE Tokens to the general public. This offering occurred after the 
company had filed a notice of exempt offering under Reg. D Rule 504. In August, 2018, after 
one extension request on the previous filings, Item Banc amended the earlier filings and filed a 
Form 1-A with Reg. A disclosures about its $20 million offering of IBE tokens.249 EpigenCare, 
Inc., a digital biotech company, located and organized in New York, leveraged the initial Reg. 
CF. filing along with a Reg. D Rule 506(c) offering.  On March 20, 2018, Epigen, Inc. filed 
both a Form C to offer $1.07 million dollars of EPIC Tokens and a Form D to offer $20 million 
dollars of the tokens.  In a later Form C-U filing, Epigen, Inc. reported that it did not meet its 
maximum goal of raising over one million dollars under the Reg. CF, the company was able to 
raise over $36,700 under Reg. CF and continue raising funds from accredited investors in the 
Reg. D filing.250 
2. Coastal Dispersion 
 
Other ways to measure the scope of investment crowdfunding include evaluating the 
geographical distribution of the company transactions; the choices of entity made by the 
companies and offering characteristics.  The data collected here reveals a longitudinal study of 
the changes that have occurred over the two-year period.  The most pronounced changes relate 
to diffusion in intermediation; concentration of the offerings geographically; a pronounced 
preference toward incorporating or organizing LLC’s in Delaware; and a normalizing of the 
types of securities offered. 
The bulk of investment crowdfunding digital token offerings financing companies are 
mainly located in the west coast. The geographic distribution, set forth in this study, illustrates 
the regional divide with respect to investment crowdfunding and even more so, in digital token 
transactions, where offerings essentially are developing on the west coast.251 This coastal 
concentration in digital token offerings, yet funding portal dispersal nationwide appears to be 
                                               
       249    Item Banc, Inc. (Form C, C/A) available at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?CIK=1742134&owner=exclude&action=getcompany&Find=Search 
       250    EpigenCare, Inc. (Form C, C/A, C-U and D/A filings) available at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-
edgar?CIK=1727821&owner=exclude&action=getcompany&Find=Search 
      251    See id. 
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similar to what Professor Magnuson called “diffusion” in the Fintech Markets.252  In Fintech 
markets, the players have “smaller sections of the market, focus on narrow industry areas, and 
often are made up of a number of nimble start-ups . . . or even computer servers.”253  From the 
data collected between 2016 and 2018, the funding portals have greater concentrations of 
offerings, while at the same time a greater number of smaller actors continue to play a role in 
advancing inclusion with respect to offerings in the marketplace. This dispersal illustrates 
pockets of digital token offerings concentrated within two – four funding portals, but a wider 
variety of funding portals and offerings nationwide. 
While the investment crowdfunding study did not look at incorporation or 
organizational documents, what is apparent from The Form C filings is that there is more 
concentration of companies selecting Delaware as the preferred choice of entity than in 2016.254  
These choices of entity seem related to “the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible 
charter and bylaw terms, and shareholder voting rights”— which Professor Lipton states “are 
controlled by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation has 
any real economic ties to that location.”255  Empirical work on choice of entity has also 
“illuminate[d] how parties actually behave” and how the “parties would be likely to behave in 
response to legal rules.”256  Professor Chen’s study contradicted the fact that business 
corporations that heavily favored Delaware as the state of incorporation actually preferred New 
York for choice of law and forum in the context of merger agreements.257   
 
 
                                               
      252    See Magnuson, supra note 168, at 7–8. 
      253    Id. 
      254 More research would be needed to determine the reasons for this flight to Delaware. It could be a function 
of larger transactions, herd behavior, or other legal, business and tax considerations. See Magnuson, supra note 
168, at 22 (explaining reasons for herd behavior in Fintech markets: “This may occur in several different ways, 
but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs sharing certain programming templates. If an algorithm 
proves successful in the market, other actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate the algorithm.”). 
       255   Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and 
Bylaws, 104 GEORGETOWN L. J. 583, 597 (2016). 
       256 Chen, supra note 180, at 6, 31–32 (“This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion reached in the Eisenberg 
and Miller study that, if a company is incorporated in Delaware, the company has a tendency to choose New York 
law."). 
       257  Id. at 3–4. 
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3. A Business Disruption? 
“All business disruptions begin with business innovations.”258  There are several reasons 
that investment crowdfunding may contribute to business disruption and innovation.  First, as 
Commissioner Quintenz claimed, digital tokens “hav[e] and will continue to have, an impact 
on title transfer and settlement processes . . .,” or otherwise a “back office tokenization 
revolution.”259  There is a belief that “digital assets are here to stay.”260  Where there is a belief, 
it will be just a matter of time before digital ledger technology will be able to verify entries 
between parties and scale to the proportion required for continuous use. 
What is more unlikely is that smart contracts will alleviate the need for middle men and 
women, until there is a potential reduction in transaction costs and also regulatory costs.261  Just 
recently, when the cost of bitcoin dropped below $3,500, pundits argue that the market price 
for bitcoin could drop to $0 because the mining transaction cost would be more than the 
potential investment.262 Which suggests that beneath the blockchain layer, there are middle men 
and without social or economic incentives, it is unclear how the blockchain sustains itself 
without drivers. It is evident that theoretically, smart contracts can allow self-regulation without 
third party intervention.  However, will it allow self-regulation in the long term, which long 
term is  the real innovation.   
Second, as Reg. CF offerings are growing, the need for a company to seek venture capital 
and angel investor funding may be replaced by this new mechanism for financing.263  Arguably 
the manner in which investment crowdfunding may disrupt these markets depends on the 
continued success of Reg. CF.  Commentators argue that there are several ways venture capital 
could be disrupted by investment crowdfunding: Actual democratization of access to capital; 
the traditionally underfunded can become successfully funded by this new access to capital; 
                                               
       258    Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1571 (2017). 
       259    See Quintenz, supra notes 151 and 152. 
       260    See Baris & Klayman, supra note 15,  at 83. 
       261    See Biber, et al., supra note 258, at 1572–1573 (“Entrepreneurs seek to minimize their transaction costs 
and production costs by selecting the most efficient size and type of business organization.”); see also R. H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 387, 397 (1937). 
       262    Atuyla Sarin, Opinion: Bitcoin is Close To Becoming Worthless, 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bitcoin-is-close-to-becoming-worthless-2018-12-03 (Last retrieved on 
December 6, 2018).  
       263    See Marks, supra note 3, at 2. 
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and that there is a proliferation of companies that do not seek the same exit and end goals as 
venture capitalists.264  
 
FINDING D1: BUSINESS DISRUPTION IS LIKELY IF DIGITAL TOKENS 
RELIANT ON THE BLOCKCHAIN ARE REALIZED, BUT WHEN 
 
 
There has been no sizeable disruption in investment crowdfunding, digital tokens or in 
capital formation as of this writing.  Again, the story of business disruption and innovation will 
take some time to determine if companies, the marketplace, investors and the communities are 
measurably changed because of the offering of the variety of securities under Reg. CF.    In the 
event that companies are able to create a fully viable digital token reliant on blockchain 
technology, that endeavor could be an innovative business disruption.  
There is one way that Reg. CF digital tokens are disrupting the investment marketplace 
and one way they are not.. On the positive disruption, these offerings can be a leverage to other, 
future initial coin offerings (“ICOs” or “initial coin offerings”). This development may provide 
both potentially good disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on the 
success of blockchain technology.  
On the other hand, there appears to be no disruption outside of the coastal areas and 
larger cities throughout the county.  For example, funding portals generally have some control 
over what offerings are hosted nationally.  The idea that a novel innovation in the state of 
Montana could find capital through and connect to investors interested in this idea is unlikely.  
Reg. CF financing is not yet democratizing capital and innovating in that manner.  Second, 
there are a host of traditionally underfunded individuals, groups, neighborhoods, and companies 
that have yet to benefit from new blockchain-based technologies.  Unless there are better ways 
to connect the traditionally underfunded with funding portals and structures, that disruption has 
not yet to evolve.  Third, currently, the data suggests that companies currently offering capital 
are still connected to the idea of exit strategies.  Most notable are the companies that are reliant 
on blockchain as a business strategy and the likelihood that the business concept will obtain 
further investment after the initial investment under Reg. CF.  Thus, Reg. CF is not yet 
disruptive in these positive ways.   
                                               
       264    See Marks, supra note 3, at 3–6. 
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What advocates of capital formation would not want to have happen is an adverse 
disruption to occur.  To the extent that investors begin to invest in poorly conceived or 
speculative investments, this activity could have a negative effect on attracting new investors 
to these markets.  This could lead to effects similar to those witnessed during the housing 
mortgage crisis of 2008, where a large influx of participants in the market had dire 
consequences when the market collapsed.  The concern is that investors not be put in a similar 
position as investors and purchasers in 2008.  In the next section, I provide some solutions to 
these troubling developments in digital tokens. 
 
PART IV: LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE  
           As much as $600 million seems like a significant amount of financing. However, that 
figure pales in comparison to ICOs, Reg. A, A+, Reg. D, 1933 Act IPO’s and other capital 
raising alternatives.  Although this research does not quantify the unmet business need for 
capital nationwide, the initial normative goals were to help entrepreneurs throughout the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia as well as to grow employment nationwide.  At the same 
time, the idea that investors may lose their investments is not a positive tradeoff for capital 
formation and employment.   
          In light of the research, the author provides recommendations towards a path forward.  
Below are several recommendations after reviewing the data.  The first relates to actions that 
the SEC should consider immediately.  The second suggestion would be for companies to 
consider.  The last are suggestions for economic development organizations. 
A. SEC Re-Evaluate Reg. CF  
 
The first recommendation is the most difficult to frame.  On the one hand, if the 
SEC regulates too much, then innovation in new types of securities and capital formation 
can die.  On the other hand, if the SEC regulates too late, then they are reacting to a worst 
case scenario where investors have already lost their money and companies are placed in a 
position of liability. The SEC must balance the time and manner in which it regulates.  That 
being the case, first, I recommend that the SEC re-evaluate whether Reg. CF will be able 
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to attain the goals of job creation and capital formation, in light of the current status of 
investment crowdfunding and the ongoing sales of SAFTs and digital tokens. 
Unfortunately, this solution will ripen only after the investment crowdfunding campaigns 
discussed in this article have concluded and other metrics have concluded such as the 
expiration of the blockchain development and a period of period of time to evaluate the 
sustainability of companies that participated. Potential evaluation time periods could be: A 
first step after the offering period ends for all companies with offerings through June 30, 
2018.  How much capital did these particular raise?  The second step would be to evaluate 
the success or failure of the companies that offered digital tokens reliant on blockchain 
development has either occurred or failed.  Did these companies accomplish their goal and 
did they provide investors with digital tokens? The third step would be to evaluate the 
success of these companies after a minimal period of five years to determine whether the 
companies are sustainable or facing financial difficulties, in the worst case, bankruptcy.  
These evaluation steps will provide great information for the SEC.  
If the short term, the SEC should publish a very detailed guidance for unaccredited 
and unsophisticated investors.  Much of the SEC’s attention has been directed towards 
unregistered initial coin offerings and ICO’s, with material misstatements sold to 
accredited investors.  As the proliferation of Reg. CF digital tokens continues and there is 
no certainty in blockchain technology, it is imperative that the SEC provide guidance 
directly to smaller investors intrigued by Reg. CF coin investments.  Current SEC guidance 
is helpful, but while the language typically references ICO’s, it does not distinguish 
between the ICO market and Reg. CF transactions.  Shareholders might think that the 
warnings regarding ICOs do not apply to them.  However, as companies are getting their 
first batch of funding from small investors before advancing to ICO markets and Venture 
Capital funding, it is important for the SEC and investment advisors to educate those small 
investors who may be taking the greatest investment risk.  More guidance may deter what 
happened when investors purchased synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)265 or 
                                               
       265   Jennifer O'Hare, Synthetic CDOS, Conflicts of Interest, and Securities Fraud, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 
678 (2014). 
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“mortgage-backed securities that lost value when the housing bubble burst.”266  In that 
advisory, the SEC must clarify its position on Reg. CF digital tokens for these investors.   
           The author recognizes that this alternative may be considered only an ideal solution for 
the investors who will read the materials, but not so much for those who do not. That being the 
case, there would be a greater chance that some investors would properly weigh the risk of loss 
to their own financial situation.  Better yet, if these investors had advisors, the advisor could 
assist them in better understanding the terms and conditions in which they plan to invest.  One 
cannot underestimate the level of potential loss in these offerings. Not to knock penny stocks, 
but if one invests $2,000 in a penny stock, the investor still can lose 100% ($2,000), not just a 
penny.   
 
B.  Issuers Weigh Other Financing “Alternatives” 
 
Third, companies, particularly those that are tipping into tokens, should thoughtfully 
consider alternatives to Reg. CF digital tokens.  There remains a level of speculation in these 
transactions, which could result in liability or greater risk than the alternative financings.  
Companies should fully consider a backup plan in the event of an unsuccessful token asset 
offering, whatever the reason for the failure.267 Although investment crowdfunding shows signs 
of being an innovative bridge to capital, the author notes some developments that raise 
uncertainties for companies and investors.  
Some of the inferences are encouraging, and raising $600 million is a good start.  
However, other aspects of the scope of investment crowdfunding transactions, such as the 
escalation of digital assets in Reg. CF transactions, show some warning signs.  Lawmakers, 
scholars, and industry representatives should continue to closely monitor this rapidly growing 
development to help foster a healthy, inclusive, and efficient expansion of company capital.  
Companies should carefully weigh “alternatives” to the coin alternative of raising 
capital.  To the extent that the company has no clue what a cryptocurrency or blockchain is, 
they should consider alternatives to this form of investment.  It is possible that developing a 
                                               
       266    Id. at 678. 
       267    Reasons might include slow timing of the blockchain; the business concept does not evolve; or merely 
because digital token sales begin to flatten.   
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new digital asset to be traded on the blockchain is exactly what that company needs to grow its 
business.  That decision comes with due diligence and the right partners to help form the right 
strategies for the business. 
 
C. Economic Development Organizations Lead The Alternatives 
Nvested is an excellent example of an economic development organization partnering 
with others to develop a funding portal to raise capital for companies in the state of Missouri.268  
After a successful campaign to launch Wellness Brewing, LLC, the funding portal announced 
recently that it is available to launch other offerings for companies.269  To realize the goals of 
capital and job creation, economic development organizations would seemingly play a greater 
role in expanding opportunities for companies to connect with potential investors. 
Dozens of states are not participating in Reg. CF offerings.  The question as to why that 
is may be a function of other alternatives that are available to companies in non-participating 
states, but also may be a need for organizations to develop funding portals that are ready, 
willing, and able to assist with the launching of these offerings.  If it is not the will, what appears 
to be missing in states that are not participating is the way to participate.  That is where 
economic development organizations can play a significant role in this new method of capital 
formation. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This research study provides a snapshot of investment crowdfunding’s broadening 
scope as a vehicle for capital formation.  In Part I, the author discussed what success under Reg. 
CF would be. The author suggested that success would be: companies engaged; companies 
raising capital; and investors with a likely potential of a return on investment. Using that success 
metric, the results are mixed. As  parts of the story is still unfolding,  the final story of 
company/investor success or failure remains to be told.  However, what we can glean from the 
                                               
       268  Nvstedwithus.com is a website owned and operated by STL Critical Technologies JVI LLC and is 
registered as a funding portal with both the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). See 
also Barker, supra notes 235 and 236. 
       269   NVSTED, https://nvstedwithus.com/raise-funds (last visited on Oct. 4, 2018). 
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study is that companies are engaged in capital campaigns using Reg. CF.  Some companies 
have been able to raise capital, while others continue to fail at raising funds. Investors, however, 
are seemingly at risk of losing their investments as the securities are developing and reliant on 
theoretical ideas.  Time will tell whether those who were the first to invest in blockchain based 
digital tokens will be successful or not. 
To recap, with respect to the types of securities offered, one can label this emergence 
as either troubling or a looming disaster that is waiting to happen.  The offering of blockchain-
based tokens is novel but selling these securities to unsophisticated and non-accredited investors 
is not ideal in the best case, and a travesty, in the worst case.  These concerns give traction to 
the scholars who have expressed concerns about the type of securities that might be offered 
under Reg. CF.  When Reg. CF was adopted, digital tokens were not initially conceptualized at 
the time of the approval of the regulations. Primarily because of the great uncertainty of these 
securities, adds to the concern that startup companies will not succeed with their business goals 
and will not raise the boats of investors along with the communities they seek to serve. 
However, there are positive and encouraging developments in Reg. CF investment 
crowdfunding.  First, there is an opening up of a variety of securities markets for the crowd to 
invest in companies as they so choose.  There is an availability of an assortment of investments 
that allow the crowd to capitalize enterprises.  More companies are able to avail themselves to 
a public access to capital with their first step towards “going public.”  It is also good to know 
that funding portals are developing across the country and providing a technological solution 
for fundraising campaigns. 
The investment crowdfunding phenomenon of securities digitally offered to the public 
has the potential of disrupting both the way companies capitalize their business and the manner 
in which funding portals and the crowd support these companies.270  As Reg. CF offerings are 
growing, the need for companies to seek venture capital and angel investor funding may be 
replaced to a degree by this new mechanism for financing.  Arguably, the manner and extent to 
                                               
       270 See Wales, supra note 13, at 218 (discussing global securities crowdfunding); see Schwartz, supra note 
11, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United States, has become a worldwide phenomenon, with 
New Zealand leading the charge.”); see also Zachary J. Robins & Timothy M. Joyce, How to Crowdfund and Not 
Fall Flat on Your Face: Best Practices for Investment crowdfunding Offerings and the Data to Prove It, 43 
MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW 1059, 1073–1090 (2017) (including a review of selected data after the first 
anniversary year 2016 and recommendations on best practices for companies and lawmakers). The type of ventures 
seeking capital is quite diverse: health/fitness, technology, restaurants, liquor, gaming, cryptocurrencies and movie 
production companies. Id. at 1076. 
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which investment crowdfunding may disrupt these markets depends on the continued success 
of Reg. CF, blockchain technology, and the interest of investors. 
It is argued that there are three ways venture capital could be disrupted by investment 
crowdfunding:  Actual democratization of access to capital; the traditionally underfunded can 
become successfully funded by this new access to capital; and the proliferation of companies 
not seeking the same exit and end goals as venture capitalists.271  However, using this basis, the 
data does not reflect any sizeable disruption at this time.  First, funding portals generally have 
some control over what offerings are hosted nationally.  The idea that a novel innovation in the 
state of Montana could find capital through and connect to investors interested in this idea, is 
unlikely.  Democratization is the ability to pick up the phone and make a phone call.  Reg. CF 
financing is not democratizing capital in that manner yet.  Secondly, there are a host of 
traditionally underfunded individuals, groups, neighborhoods, and companies that are still 
underfunded.  Unless there are greater ways to connect the traditionally underfunded with 
funding portals and structures, that disruption has not yet to evolve.  Most notable are the 
companies that rely on the blockchain as a business strategy and the likelihood that the business 
concept will obtain further investment after the initial investment under Reg. CF.  Thus, Reg. 
CF is not disruptive in these positive ways yet.  However, Reg. CF’s disruptive effects still have 
potential. 
Another concern is whether investment crowdfunding could be a disrupter in a negative 
way.  To the extent that investors begin to invest in poorly conceived or speculative investments 
and lose their money, this activity could have a negative effect on future investors in the 
marketplace.  To ensure that investors not revisit the devastation of the mortgage debacle of 
2008, caution is the word of the day.  However, the possibility of a future being recreated by 
the successful development of blockchain technology is not a bad dream to have.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
       271    See Marks, supra note 3, at 3–6. 
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29,088 with footnotes.      20,426  without footnotes. 
